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Full implementation of human rights requires a wide range of initiatives, many of which fall 
beyond the expertise of the UN human rights ‘mainland’, consisting of the Human Rights 
Council, treaty-bodies, and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). 
Specialized agencies, funds, programs and other UN bodies have an indispensable role to play if 
the UN system is to engage with the entire spectrum of human rights implementation. Their role 
encompasses all human rights, but is especially critical in relation to economic, social and 
cultural rights. The Human Rights Council and OHCHR are mandated to promote human rights 
mainstreaming which is a pre-condition for full implementation. However, UN system-wide 
mainstreaming runs into the principles of functional decentralization and autonomy which are 
woven into the fabric of the UN. Accordingly, human rights have to be ‘owned’ by each agency 
and similar UN body. There is today an emerging ‘archipelago’ of human rights initiatives, lying 
beyond the UN human rights ‘mainland’, in agencies and other UN bodies. The contemporary 
UN human rights system should be configured as the ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ and the 
article outlines ways to promote its appropriate development, including new working methods 
for the Human Rights Council. 
I. Introduction 
In 2005, when UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan spoke for the last time to the Commission on 
Human Rights, he emphasized that “the era of declaration is now giving way, as it should, to an 
era of implementation.”1 The UN human rights system is often understood as the Human Rights 
Council, human rights treaty-bodies, the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).2 This article calls this combination the UN 
human rights ‘mainland’ and argues a UN human rights system consisting only of the ‘mainland’ 
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cannot adequately advance human rights in the “era of implementation”. It suggests the UN 
human rights system should be understood as including the ‘mainland’ and an ‘archipelago’ of 
human rights initiatives across the organization. The ‘archipelago’ is beginning to take shape 
through the emergence of human rights initiatives, beyond the ‘mainland’, in specialized 
agencies, funds, programs and other UN bodies. These initiatives, which have an essential role to 
play in the “era of implementation”, need sustained support, constructive scrutiny and quality 
control of their human rights content. In short, the UN human rights system should be configured 
as the ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ otherwise the “era of implementation” cannot succeed. 
How the UN human rights system is conceptualized determines how policy-makers, practitioners 
and scholars approach human rights. A UN human rights system envisioned as the ‘mainland’ 
will give rise to a number of strategies and methods. A UN human rights system envisioned as 
the ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ will give rise to different strategies and methods. Numerous 
UN bodies which are not part of the ‘mainland’, such as specialized agencies have a vital role in 
Kofi Annan’s “era of implementation”. Configuring the UN human rights system as including 
only the ‘mainland’ excludes implementing organizations and initiatives that are crucial in this 
modern era. Excluding the ‘archipelago’ from the UN human rights system runs the risk of 
holding back what the General Assembly refers to as “the full implementation of human rights 
obligations undertaken by States”.3 
Although configuring the UN human rights system as ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ gives 
rise to a number of challenging issues, it is consistent with the principles of functional 
decentralization and autonomy upon which the UN is constructed.4 This configuration of the 
human rights system does not require structural reform of the UN. On the contrary, the human 
rights system configured as ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ is respectful of the foundational 
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principles of the existing UN structure. It is the UN human rights system understood as only the 
‘mainland’ that fails to take account of the existing structure of the UN, thereby limiting the 
development of human rights in the “era of implementation”. 
The “era of implementation” depends upon constructive engagement between the 
‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’, and therefore also among different professions, disciplines, 
interest groups, social movements and what Haas calls “epistemic communities”.5 This requires 
careful attention to the concepts, purposes and demands of different groups, otherwise 
misunderstandings are likely to abound.6 One aim of this article is to draw attention to some 
important terms, as well as distinctions between them. International supervision is not 
implementation. Mainstreaming is not coordination, but a pre-condition for what the General 
Assembly calls “full implementation”.7 Monitoring is not accountability. Are compliance and 
implementation the same? These are among the terms and distinctions that this article considers.8 
Many inhabitants of the ‘mainland’ have little familiarity with the increasingly complex 
‘archipelago’. Also, viewed from the ‘archipelago’, the ‘mainland’ has the appearance of a 
foreign country populated by people speaking a foreign language. The article aims to introduce 
the inhabitants of the ‘mainland’ to some features of the ‘archipelago’ and inhabitants of the 
‘archipelago’ to some features of the ‘mainland.’ 
Configuring the UN human rights system as ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ raises difficult 
questions. How to generate suitable initiatives, within agencies, funds, programs and other UN 
bodies, which may become part of the ‘archipelago’? To what degree, if at all, may the 
‘archipelago’ translate the international code of human rights into language, concepts and 
practices that are meaningful to those working in the ‘archipelago’? What is the appropriate 
relationship between ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’? What working methods does the ‘mainland’ 
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need so it can play a supportive and constructive role in relation to the ‘archipelago’? How to 
exercise some form of quality control to ensure policy and practice in the ‘archipelago’ is 
coherent and consistent with international human rights law? These are among the issues that this 
article begins to address. 
Following this Introduction, section II outlines two conceptualizations of the UN human 
rights system: one is narrow and the other is broad. Section III considers the meaning and 
implications of human rights implementation and section IV explores mainstreaming, especially 
in the context of the mandates of the Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. Section V discusses the implications of the principles of functional 
decentralization and autonomy upon which the UN is constructed. Section VI outlines the 
emerging UN human rights ‘archipelago’ and introduces four possible illustrations: International 
Labour Organization; Human Rights up Front; WHO’s Gender, Equity and Rights Team; and a 
cluster of initiatives within the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Section 
VII outlines three practical ways to promote the development of the UN human rights system 
understood as ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’. The Conclusion emphasizes the “era of 
implementation” requires new thinking, strategies and methods. 
The UN call to mainstream human rights is not confined to agencies, funds, programs and 
similar UN bodies, for example, it extends to peace-keeping operations established by the 
Security Council.9 However, this article mainly focuses on the emerging human rights 
‘archipelago’ in UN agencies, funds, programs and similar bodies.10 
II. What comprises the UN human rights system? 
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The UN human rights system is part of the large and complex international human rights 
regime.11 Some key features of the international human rights regime, such as regional human 
rights instruments, institutions and processes, fall outside the UN human rights system. Although 
there is no hard-and-fast definition of the UN human rights system, there are two main views 
about what it comprises. 
The most widely held view is that the UN human rights system consists of the Human 
Rights Council, treaty-bodies and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, underpinned by 
OHCHR. To this is sometimes added the General Assembly’s Third Committee. When Kofi 
Annan addressed the Commission on Human Rights in 2005 he referred to “the three central 
pillars of the United Nations human rights system: the treaty bodies, the Office of the High 
Commissioner and the inter-governmental machinery.”12 Kevin Boyle also conceived of “a 
three-limb international human rights protection system” consisting of the Human Rights 
Council, treaty-bodies and High Commissioner;13 although Boyle referred to the “international 
human rights protection system”, the context suggests he was referring to the UN human rights 
system. A recent OHCHR publication observes that the “UN strives to promote and protect 
human rights in three basic ways”, namely via inter-governmental bodies, such as the Human 
Rights Council, treaty-bodies and OHCHR.14 In 2009, Petter Wille wrote that the “main pillars 
of the United Nations human rights machinery” are the Human Rights Council, treaty-bodies, 
OHCHR and General Assembly.15 The proponents of this view of the UN human rights system 
recognize the importance of other UN bodies for the promotion and protection of human rights. 
For example, OHCHR explains that it “works closely with UN specialized agencies, funds and 
programmes . . . to maximize the impact of human rights work”.16 But “work[ing] closely with” 
is not the same as seeing these bodies as part of the UN human rights system.  
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In 1992, Philip Alston provided an early intimation of an alternative, more expansive 
view of the UN human rights system. In The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical 
Appraisal, he wrote that the international human rights regime “must embrace … the 
authentically human rights-conscious UN agencies, such as the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO)”.17 (We can assume that such UN agencies not only form part of the international 
human rights regime but also the UN human rights system.) Alston conceived of the UN human 
rights system as including the Commission (as it then was), treaty-bodies and the human rights 
secretariat, as well as “authentically human rights-conscious UN agencies”. More recently, Rosa 
Freedman took the same position: she wrote that “the ‘UN Human Rights Machinery’” includes 
“UN specialised agencies”.18 In 2014, Dinah Shelton edited The United Nations System for 
Protecting Human Rights which also has a large vision of what constitutes the UN human rights 
system. In her introductory chapter, Shelton writes: “The United Nations human rights system … 
consists of a network of norms addressing rights and obligations, together with institutions and 
procedures related to the promotion and protection of human rights. Beyond the treaty bodies 
and UN organs proper, this system embraces UN agencies such as the International Labour 
Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the 
World Health Organization.”19 
In short, Annan, Wille, Boyle and OHCHR have a narrower conception of what 
constitutes the UN human rights system than Alston, Freedman and Shelton. All share much 
common ground, in particular that the UN system encompasses the Council, treaty-bodies and 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights, underpinned by OHCHR.20 This common ground is 
what this article calls the UN human rights ‘mainland’. Alston, Freedman and Shelton agree that 
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the UN human rights system is not confined to this ‘mainland’ but also encompasses human 
rights initiatives within agencies, funds, programs and other UN bodies. Scattered across the 
organization, these human rights initiatives are the UN human rights ‘archipelago’. 
In summary, based on Shelton, the United Nations human rights system can be understood as a 
network of norms which include explicit human rights standards and commitments, combined 
with institutions, processes and other arrangements, located within the UN, including its 
agencies, funds, programs and similar bodies, which are closely related to the promotion and 
protection of human rights. In other words, the UN human rights system consists of the human 
rights ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’. 
III. What Does "Implementation" Mean? 
A year after the Secretary-General’s spoke about the “era of implementation”, the General 
Assembly adopted the resolution establishing the Human Rights Council and mandating it to 
promote the “full implementation of human rights obligations undertaken by States and follow-
up to the goals and commitments related to the promotion and protection of human rights 
emanating from United Nations conferences and summits”.21 
In this new era, what is meant by “full implementation”? Arambulo observes that, in the 
context of international human rights, ‘implementation’ has acquired the meaning of 
‘supervision’ or ‘monitoring’.22 This usage may derive from the early 1950s when the UN 
Commission on Human Rights spent much time discussing the “measures of implementation” for 
the draft international covenants on human rights, and the measures in question were varieties of 
international supervision, such as systems of periodic reporting and petition.23 After the 
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Commission agreed supervisory procedures for ICESCR and ICCPR, Alston, Samson, Craven, 
Simma and others have referred to these international procedures as ‘implementation’.24 This is a 
very narrow understanding of the word. Arambulo adds that this meaning of ‘implementation’ 
should not be confused with “implementation at the national level”, such as “policy-making, the 
adoption of legislative measures and . . . decisions of the national judiciary organs.”25 
Implementation may be understood as efforts to administer and action legal and policy 
directives.26 The term ‘efforts’ includes plans, programs, projects, practices and other 
interventions or initiatives. The word ‘policy’ implies a reasonably cohesive set of responses (i.e. 
not a collection of ad hoc initiatives) designed to address a long-term purpose or particular 
problem.27 For example, the purpose or problem might be associated with human rights 
realization. Thus, in the present context, ‘implementation’ includes laws, regulations, judicial 
and quasi-judicial decisions, policies, plans, programs, projects, practices and other interventions 
or initiatives that are designed to ensure the realization of human rights. 
A. A Spectrum of Implementation 
There is a spectrum of implementation efforts, each becoming more practical and specific in time 
and place, and “each successively more executive rather than legislative.”28 Legal 
implementation, such as passing laws and regulations, occupies one part of the implementation 
spectrum. Highlighting that legal implementation is likely to be necessary but not sufficient, 
some authors have identified two interrelated dimensions of implementation: laws and the 
operational delivery of human rights in communities and beyond.29 Similarly, Meier and Onzivu, 
and Meier and Ayala, refer to the “operationalization” of human rights.30 
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As already noted, the Human Rights Council’s mandate includes the promotion of “full 
implementation”, a formulation which suggests that efforts confined to only one or two bands on 
the implementation spectrum, such as passing laws and regulations, will not suffice. Logically, a 
state may have only partially implemented an international human rights law. 
B. Compliance 
Although implementation and compliance are often conflated they are conceptually distinct. 
Compliance may be defined as “conformity to rules”.31 According to Neyer and Wolf, 
“(a)ssessing compliance is restricted to the description of the discrepancy between the (legal) 
text of the regulation and the action and behaviors of its addressees.”32 Jana von Stein divides 
compliance into two categories: adherence to rules (first-order compliance) and adherence to 
rulings of judicial or other bodies (second-order compliance).33 If compliance is understood in 
this way, human rights require compliance and implementation. As with implementation, states 
may be in partial compliance.34 
C. Implementation and the UN Agencies: “Principles Into Practicalities” 
When Shelton speaks of “UN organs proper” she refers to the six principal organs which are 
central to the United Nations: the General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social 
Council, Trusteeship Council (now suspended), International Court of Justice and Secretariat.35 
Grouped around the UN “proper” are a large number of intergovernmental agencies, funds, 
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programs and other entities working in a range of economic, social and cultural fields.36 Within 
their mandates, these organizations provide states with expert policy guidance, technical 
assistance, capacity building, normative standards, accountability mechanisms and some of them 
also provide financial help. For example, they may help states deliver health services (e.g. 
WHO), improve food security (e.g. FAO), provide decent work (e.g. ILO), promote literacy (e.g. 
UNESCO), and so on. Baehr and Gordenker call these organizations “operational” because, in 
their fields of expertise, they help states strengthen practical implementation.37 With a few 
exceptions, most notably the ILO, the organizations do not explicitly and consistently use human 
rights language and analysis. However, if human rights were effectively mainstreamed into these 
organizations, they could serve as very powerful engines for the implementation of explicit rights 
to health, food, work, education and other human rights.38 
Since it forms part of the International Bill of Rights, consider Part IV of ICESCR.39 Part 
IV (Articles 16-25) anticipates two major roles for specialized agencies. First, it gives them a 
central role in the Covenant’s supervisory process, for example, agencies will report to ECOSOC 
about the progress made by State parties in relation to the Covenant’s provisions40 and also 
advise on “international measures likely to contribute to the effective progressive 
implementation of the present Covenant.”41 Happily, ECOSOC has replaced this Part IV process 
with an immeasurably better supervisory system (i.e. CESCR and its processes) which is in place 
today.42 Nonetheless, it is instructive that the drafters of the International Bill of Rights gave a 
central role to specialized agencies in relation to ICESCR. 
Also, Part IV of the Covenant includes an important provision which is independent of 
the now-replaced supervisory process. Article 23 says: “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant agree that international action for the achievement of the rights recognized in the 
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present Covenant includes such methods as the conclusion of conventions, the adoption of 
recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance and the holding of regional meetings 
and technical meetings for the purpose of consultation and study organized in conjunction with 
the Government concerned.” It is clear from the wording (e.g. “the conclusion of conventions, 
the adoption of recommendations, the furnishing of technical assistance”), and from the context, 
that article 23 anticipates specialized agencies will take “international action for the achievement 
of the rights recognized in the … Covenant”. With a few exceptions, again most notably the ILO, 
specialized agencies have given little attention to article 23. While the role of specialized 
agencies in relation to the Part IV supervisory system has been superseded, their role in relation 
to article 23 has not. Alston observed that the “specialized agencies bring to their role under the 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights a technical competence and expertise in 
relevant matters which is unmatched.”43 The abiding challenge is to find effective ways to 
harness this unrivalled competence and expertise for the “full implementation” of the Covenant. 
Wilfred Jenks shed light on the relationship between specialized agencies and human 
rights implementation. One of the architects of the UN, Jenks attended the San Francisco 
Conference in 1945, contributed to the drafting of the International Bill of Rights and served as 
Director-General of the ILO (1970-73). In 1969, he considered “the International Labour Code” 
i.e. the conventions, recommendations and practice devised by the ILO over several decades. He 
wrote: “In relation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations 
Covenants of Human Rights, the International Labour Code is the bridge from principle to 
practice”.44 He elaborated that the ILO “translates” articles 6-10 of ICESCR “from principles 
into practicalities.”45 Articles 6-10 are on rights to work, rights in work, and some social welfare 
rights. Jenks concluded that the “result is that the ILO becomes in practice, and is envisaged by 
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the United Nations Covenant as being, the executing agency of these provisions of the 
Covenant.”46 He added that this could serve as a “prototype” in other fields, such as health, food 
and education.47 Jenks also emphasized the importance of article 23 of ICESCR.48 Occasionally, 
states remind agencies of their human rights responsibilities, for example, Norway recently 
highlighted that “specialized agencies are also mandated to promote a rights perspective.”49 
D. Conclusion 
If implementation includes laws, regulations, judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, policies, 
plans, programs, projects, practices and other interventions or initiatives that are designed to 
ensure the realization of human rights, the UN human rights system, narrowly understood as the 
‘mainland’, cannot adequately advance human rights in the “era of implementation”. Much of 
the spectrum of implementation falls beyond the institutional competence, expertise and capacity 
of the UN human rights ‘mainland’. For “full implementation”, the ‘mainland’ needs the 
institutional competence, expertise and capacity of a wide range of agencies, funds, programs 
and similar UN bodies. ICESCR and other treaties highlight the important role of agencies if 
international human rights are to be achieved. As Jenks put it, agencies were conceived as having 
the task of translating human rights “into practicalities”. Describing the Norwegian position, 
Sjoberg emphasizes “implementation is the responsibility of the UN system as a whole, not just 
the dedicated human rights institutions.”50 
In summary, the UN human rights system should be understood as including the 
‘mainland’ and an ‘archipelago’ of initiatives in agencies, funds, programs and similar UN 
bodies which are advancing the “full implementation” of human rights. Both ‘mainland’ and 
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‘archipelago’ have indispensable roles to play. 
IV. Mainstreaming 
The spectrum of implementation efforts, signaled in the preceding section, depends upon 
mainstreaming. It is impossible to implement fully human rights without their effective 
mainstreaming into law, policy and practice. Effective mainstreaming is a pre-condition for the 
“full implementation” of human rights. Both the High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
Human Rights Council are mandated to advance human rights mainstreaming across the United 
Nations. In other words, Kofi Annan’s “era of implementation” is also the era of 
mainstreaming.51 
This section provides a critical introduction to UN human rights mainstreaming in 
general. Building on this platform, section VI examines in more detail how some agencies and 
other UN bodies have endeavored to mainstream human rights in their activities. The adoption of 
Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and the launch of the 
Sustainable Development Goals in January 2016, have given renewed impetus to human rights 
mainstreaming in the UN human rights system.52 
A. What Does Mainstreaming Mean? 
Darrow and Arbour confirm there is no universally agreed definition of mainstreaming.53 They 
suggest mainstreaming’s “general purpose is usually to bring an important or “cross-cutting” 
issue from the periphery to the center of policymaking or programming”.54 Kedzia advises that 
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human rights mainstreaming means “the integration of the international human rights standards 
and methodologies in the work of an organisation.”55 McCrudden explains: “By 
“mainstreaming”, I mean the reorganization, improvement, development and evaluation of 
policy processes, so that a human rights perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels 
and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making.”56 Oberleitner provides a 
fuller commentary, the core of which is that “human rights norms, standards and principles must 
be incorporated in decision-making on policies, operational issues and budgets, be made part of 
an organisation’s bureaucratic process, culture, and be internalised by staff. It means that 
organisations must operationalise abstract international norms.”57 This article favours 
Oberleitner’s description because it includes bureaucratic processes and also highlights the roles 
of operationalisation, institutional culture and staff internalisation. However, all of these 
definitions, when applied to the United Nations, require the OHCHR and Council to reach out 
beyond the human rights ‘mainland’ and advance the development of an ‘archipelago’ of 
‘authentic’ human rights initiatives across the organisation.58 
B. OHCHR 
Adopted in 1993, the General Assembly resolution establishing OHCHR does not mandate the 
High Commissioner to ‘mainstream’, but to “coordinate”, human rights throughout the United 
Nations, an important distinction that is discussed in section V.59 The High Commissioner’s 
explicit mandate to mainstream human rights across the United Nations was generated by Kofi 
Annan’s three major reports on UN reform published between 1997 and 2005.60 For example, his 
third report confirmed that “human rights must be incorporated into decision-making and 
15 
discussion throughout the work of the Organisation” and observed that the “concept of 
‘mainstreaming’ human rights has gained greater attention in recent years, but it has still not 
been adequately reflected in key policy and resource decisions.”61 The Outcome Document of 
the 2005 World Summit emphasized the commitment of states to “support the further 
mainstreaming of human rights throughout the United Nations system”.62 OHCHR was given 
responsibility (or co-responsibility with the Council) for driving this immense agenda. Kevin 
Boyle, senior adviser to Mary Robinson, wrote that mainstreaming was “her most challenging 
institutional task during her tenure as High Commissioner.”63 
Annan’s reforms led to the re-organization of the Secretariat’s work around five 
substantive fields: peace and security, economic and social affairs, development, humanitarian 
affairs and human rights. Executive Committees were established in the first four areas, while 
human rights were designated as cross-cutting. Instead of establishing an Executive Committee 
for human rights, the OHCHR became a member of each of the four committees in a bid to 
mainstream human rights into each substantive area.64 Subsequently, other inter-agency 
mechanisms were established, such as the Global Migration Group, in which OHCHR is a key 
player.65 Today, OHCHR leads mainstreaming within the UN secretariat through six work 
streams, for example, it chairs the UN Development Group’s Human Rights Working Group 
which seeks to accelerate human rights mainstreaming within the organization’s development 
work.66 
C. Human Rights Council67 
The UN General Assembly resolution establishing the Human Rights Council sets out the 
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Council’s principal mandate in paragraph 3. This paragraph mandates the Council to “address 
situations of violations of human rights” and “promote the effective coordination and 
mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system”.68 In other words, human 
rights mainstreaming is one of the Council’s core mandated functions. This is a major departure 
because human rights mainstreaming was not a priority in the Commission’s mandate. In 2007, 
the Council adopted an institution-building package which laid the foundations for its work, as 
well as the work of its mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).69 
Remarkably, this important document does not mention the Council’s mainstreaming mandate.  
In 2011, the Council conducted a five-year review of its work, implicitly recognised that 
it was not discharging its mainstreaming mandate, and agreed to hold a half-day high-level panel 
once a year on mainstreaming.70 For the most part these annual panels of three hours have been 
disappointing.71 Panellists usually have five minutes for opening remarks; states and others may 
contribute from the floor for two minutes; and panellists may make a few concluding remarks. 
After researching the panels of 2012-2015, Giannuzzi concludes that the “discussions mostly 
produce general and rhetorical statements and do not reveal an in-depth analysis of the issue of 
mainstreaming, the identification of challenges nor a thorough examination of best practices.”72 
However, the Council has taken some important steps towards mainstreaming, for 
example it adopted technical guidance on maternal mortality and morbidity (2012), as well as 
technical guidance on under-five mortality (2014).73 By explaining how human rights can be 
integrated into specific policies and practices, both sets of guidance are major contributions 
towards human rights mainstreaming in health. Nonetheless, according to reliable commentators, 
the Council’s mainstreaming record is weaker than the Commission’s.74 Since the Commission 
did not prioritise mainstreaming, while the Council’s mandate does, this is extraordinary. 
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Do the Council’s ‘special procedures’ promote mainstreaming? They contribute to part of 
the implementation spectrum, for example, by critiquing existing policies and programs and 
recommending new ones. But they are not in a position to contribute to the full band-width of the 
implementation spectrum. Also, a ‘special procedure’ is an accountability mechanism and this 
requires it to remain at arm-length from states and others so that, if necessary, it can report to the 
Council (and the world) that governmental or other policies are inconsistent with international 
human rights standards. The promotion of mainstreaming demands a different sort of 
relationship with states and others; it requires a closer, more collaborative partnership. So a 
‘special procedure’ can help to promote mainstreaming, but to a limited degree, something more 
is needed. 
The relationship between UPR and mainstreaming is more complex. For example, it is 
necessary to distinguish between (a) civil and political rights, and economic, social and cultural 
rights, and also between (b) the participation of civilian and military departments.75 Both will be 
briefly considered in turn. 
In most countries, ministries of justice and the interior are responsible for law and order, 
detention, trials and issues around the rights to expression, assembly and association. Moreover, 
these ministries are usually responsible for the implementation of civil and political rights. 
Implementation is often problematic, but civil and political rights are already familiar to many 
ministries of justice and the interior. During UPR, countries under review are often represented 
by politicians, policy-makers and lawyers from these ministries. In short, the Council routinely 
engages with those responsible for civil and political rights and, in this way, may help to further 
implement and mainstream those rights. 
But the situation in relation to ESCR is different. By way of illustration, consider the 
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right to health. When serving as UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health, it was the author’s 
experience that most ministries of justice and the interior had no understanding of the right to 
health whatsoever. It is unusual for individuals with health expertise to participate in UPR. So it 
is difficult for the UPR process to promote meaningful implementation and mainstreaming of the 
right to health with credibility or authority. Flavia Bustreo, WHO Assistant Director-General, 
recently observed: “from the right to health perspective the UPR mechanism has been of very 
limited utility because the discussion … is always focused on civil and political rights”.76 
However, in their recent discussion of UPR, Kate Gilmore and UNFPA colleagues find that 
sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) “is one of the most frequently cited issues in 
the UPR process.”77 The reasons for this require more research. For example, is it because 
Gilmore and colleagues define SRHR issues as including ratification of some treaties, the lifting 
of some treaty reservations, gender equality and gender-based violence?78 Or are SRHR issues 
among the most frequently cited in UPR because some of them, such as female genital 
mutilation, are closely associated with civil and political rights? Or because of the extraordinary 
work of UNFPA, WHO and many others on SRHR? In any event, in comparison to health-rights 
generally, the prominent place of SRHR in UPR appears to be exceptional. On the whole, the 
current UPR practice is better placed to contribute to implementation and mainstreaming of civil 
and political rights than ESCR. 
The preceding remarks address UPR and civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights in relation to civilian departments, such as ministries of justice and the interior. But 
ministries of defence also have responsibilities for human rights implementation and 
mainstreaming. For example, the rights of detainees, as well as the prohibition against torture, 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, are highly relevant to the work of the 
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military. Yet it is unusual for representatives of ministries of defence to participate in UPR. This 
limits UPR’s capacity to promote meaningful human rights implementation and mainstreaming 
in ministries of defence, including the development of a nuanced relationship between 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
In summary, the Council is the United Nations apex political body with specific 
responsibility for the promotion of human rights mainstreaming. To date it has done little to 
discharge this responsibility. The General Assembly gave the Council the historic role of 
providing political leadership for human rights mainstreaming, but it has yet to provide this 
leadership. 
D. Country Selectivity by the Back Door?79 
The documents that place responsibilities on OHCHR and the Human Rights Council to 
mainstream human rights do not confine mainstreaming to development cooperation. For 
example, according to the resolution establishing the Council, it is required to promote 
“mainstreaming of human rights within the United Nations system”80 – it does not add, “in 
relation to development cooperation”. The UN has the responsibility to provide policy, technical 
and other guidance for all countries. Moreover, human rights mainstreaming is a challenge for all 
countries, including high-income countries. However, there is a tendency for human rights 
mainstreaming to give particular attention to development.81 For example, in 2003 the UN 
agencies agreed the Common Understanding of a Human Rights-based Approach but it is 
confined to development cooperation.82 If there is a focus on development, high-income 
countries largely escape attention.83 One reason why the Council replaced the Commission on 
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Human Rights was to eliminate country selectivity. The Council’s key innovation, Universal 
Periodic Review, was designed to avoid selectivity. Indeed, the resolution establishing the 
Council requires that its work shall be guided by several principles, including “non-selectivity”.84 
However, if human rights mainstreaming focuses on development, this is country selectivity by 
the back door, which runs the risk of discrediting both human rights and mainstreaming.  
E. Mainstreaming: A Problematic Concept 
Charlesworth warns that the “technique of gender mainstreaming has stripped the feminist 
concept of “gender” of any radical or political potential.”85 Rather than bringing gender and 
women from the margins into the mainstream, she favors “[c]hanging the course of the 
mainstream.” Koskenniemi takes an analogous position in relation to human rights 
mainstreaming.86 He warns that there are “many dangers in seeking to transform human rights 
experts into mainstream administrators.”87 He argues there is “certainly much to be said in 
favour of human rights staying outside regular administrative procedures, as critics and 
watchdogs, flagging the interests and preferences of those who are not regularly represented in 
administrative institutions”.88 Koskenniemi recalls that human rights “arose from revolution, not 
from a call for mainstreaming” and the “ethos of revolution” is “opposite to the ethos of 
mainstream”.89 McCrudden is concerned that human rights mainstreaming “may become a soft 
option”.90 Oberleitner, although in favor of human rights mainstreaming, highlights that it “may 
transform the simple and powerful message of human rights as a protective and empowering 
force into mere management tools.”91 While the author was working on this article, a senior 
diplomat observed that in his department they refer to mainstreaming as a way of “disappearing” 
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an issue. 
There are two main responses to these criticisms and comments. First, human rights have 
different roles for different actors in different contexts. Human rights may be insurrectional, 
inspirational, judicial or operational. One group may denounce, another litigate and another 
operationalize by way of mainstreaming. Mainstreaming does not rule out other human rights 
roles. As Oberleitner puts it: “The “dispersion of human rights norms into the management of a 
range of global concerns does not necessarily deny, or take away, their (‘revolutionary’) 
character as agents of change, but rather allows for tackling the causes and consequences of 
human rights violations in a more comprehensive way.”92 
Second, like most tools, mainstreaming can be applied effectively or ineffectively. 
Effective human rights mainstreaming is complex, challenging and contextual and will usually 
be work-in-progress.93 Like human rights implementation, it requires monitoring, review and 
quality control by suitably designed bodies. 
The word ‘mainstreaming’, as an image, is misleading if it conveys the idea of human 
rights discourse, analysis and concepts flowing into other fields of law, policy and practice.94 To 
mix metaphors, mainstreaming is better understood as a two-way street. For example, human 
rights mainstreaming requires that those working in the fields of health and human rights listen 
to, and learn from, each other with a view to enhancing the rights, dignity and well-being of 
individuals, communities and populations. Without careful attention to health discourse, analysis, 
concepts and practice, the implementation of the right to health will be still-born. Implying such 
mutuality, McCosker calls for “practical ‘interoperability’” between international human rights 
and humanitarian law.95 By analogy, mainstreaming requires “practical ‘interoperability’” 
between human rights and other fields of law, policy and practice. How this can be done without 
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compromising international and national human rights law is one of the great challenges of 
human rights mainstreaming. But it can only be achieved by way of respectful dialogue between 
all those concerned. 
F. Conclusion 
The “full implementation” of human rights depends upon effective mainstreaming. If human 
rights are to be mainstreamed within the United Nations, more clarity is needed about what 
mainstreaming means in this context.96 According to their mandates, the mainstreaming 
responsibilities of the High Commissioner, OHCHR and Human Rights Council are not confined 
to development. 
This article aims to provide neither a comprehensive survey, nor an assessment, of 
OHCHR’s mainstreaming activities.97 However, the author has the impression that the High 
Commissioner and OHCHR have approached their mainstreaming mandate with vigor and made 
notable progress, despite major structural and financial constraints.98 This contrasts sharply with 
the mainstreaming record of the Human Rights Council.  
Oberleitner reflects that when organisations, in response to the call for mainstreaming, 
“start producing internal documents - policy briefs, handbooks and guidelines - they contribute, 
in essence, to human rights standard-setting and to the clarification and interpretation of human 
rights norms.”99 In other words, effective mainstreaming accelerates the development of the UN 
human rights ‘archipelago’ and challenges the narrow conception of the UN human rights 
system. 
Also, Oberleitner highlights that one of the reasons why human rights mainstreaming is a 
23 
challenge is “because it means departing from the 1945 model of splitting up the management of 
the Global Commons to separate specialised agencies”.100 This crucial issue is discussed in the 
next section, before section VI examines in more detail how some agencies and other UN bodies 
have endeavored to mainstream human rights in their activities. 
 
V. The UN, Functional Decentralization and Autonomy 
Beginning in the 1930s, David Mitrany developed an approach to international organization 
known as functionalism.101 He drew from the work of Leonard Woolf, as well as precedents such 
as the Universal Postal Union, established in 1875.102 Mitrany was also inspired by the New Deal 
public works programmes of US President Franklin Roosevelt, such as the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, a new institution providing a specific public service and detached from the territorial 
basis of one state authority.103 Engstrom calls Mitrany “one of the key architects of the functional 
approach to institutions”.104 
Romanian-born, Mitrany was employed by the British Foreign Office during World War 
II, and he developed the functionalist conception in a number of essays, such as A Working 
Peace System.105 The “central feature of the functional approach is the creation of international 
agencies with limited and specific powers defined by the function that they perform.”106 The aim 
was to insulate international functional cooperation from security and political disputes between 
states. 
Functionalism shaped the structure of the United Nations.107 In 1950, Jenk’s contrasted 
the UN with the League of Nations: “The constitutional arrangements of the United Nations, in 
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contrast to those of the League, are based on a definite principle of decentralized authority.”108 
This principle has system-wide application: “the architects of the United Nations deliberately 
based their work on the principle of functional decentralization, both within the central 
machinery of the United Nations and as the basis of the relations between the United Nations and 
the specialized agencies.”109 Contrasting their position with the UN Secretary-General, Jenks 
observes the executive heads of the specialized agencies “in general, are responsible only to the 
governing bodies or equivalent organs of their respective organizations.”110 He sums up: “All of 
the specialized agencies have been designed to play a part in a co-operative scheme … based 
essentially on autonomy tempered by common responsibility and organized consultation.”111 In 
the 1970s, Luard adopts the same analysis112 and in the 1990s Samson confirms: “One must bear 
in mind that the UN system . . . is based on the principle of functional decentralization and 
autonomy.”113 
According to the Charter, six principal organs are central to the United Nations.114 Article 
57 provides that “various specialized agencies, established by inter-governmental agreement and 
having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, 
social, cultural, educational, health and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the 
United Nations”.115 The six principal organs are what Shelton refers to as the “UN organs 
proper” and, crucially, the agencies are “brought into relationship with the United Nations”.116 In 
other words, the agencies are not “UN organs proper”. As the US Secretary of State put it in his 
Report to the President on the Results of the San Francisco Conference following the negotiation 
of the Charter of the United Nations: “The design is clear: the specialized agencies are to be 
accorded the greatest measure of freedom and initiative compatible with purposeful and co-
ordinated action on the part of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the 
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agencies and organizations brought into relationship with them.”117 “It will be the function of the 
Organization”, he added, “to co-ordinate rather than to control.”118 
Although they are not specialized agencies, numerous funds (e.g. UNICEF), programs 
(e.g. UNDP) and other entities (e.g. UNAIDS) are important United Nations organizations. 
Consistent with functionalism, they have their own governing boards, programs of work and 
budgets, and enjoy a large measure of autonomy. As Samson explains, the UN system is 
“characterized by the existence of a series of distinct organizations, each governed by its own 
constitution, with its distinctive competence, its own organs of government, its own programme, 
and its own budget.”119 Baehr and Gordenker liken specialized agencies to “fiefdoms”.120 
Of course, the states operating within these largely autonomous organizations are not 
above the law. For example, when states’ representatives sit on an agency’s executive board, 
they remain subject to the international and national law obligations entered into by their 
states.121 
Luard, Archer and others have critiqued functionalism, for example, they have questioned 
the assumption that it is possible to separate functional and political issues.122 NGOs have 
questioned the democratic credentials of agencies, while privatization and deregulation have 
challenged the public sector orientation of the original functionalist scheme.123 Nonetheless, 
despite major problems and controversies, UN member states appear to see functionalist entities 
as “valuable instruments” to further their multilateral objectives.124 
 
A. Coordination is not Mainstreaming125 
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Functional decentralization and autonomy depend upon effective coordination within the UN. 
Based on article 63(2) of the Charter, ECOSOC is the main intergovernmental coordination 
mechanism and the UN Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) - formerly the 
Administrative Committee on Coordination - is the main bureaucratic coordination device. CEB 
describes itself as the “longest-standing and highest-level coordination forum of the United 
Nations system.”126 Despite these arrangements, Baehr and Gordenker refer to coordination as 
“perhaps a hopeless task” because of the UN’s “organizational tangle and interrelated 
activity”.127 
The coordination of human rights is layered onto these generic coordination 
arrangements. As already observed, the General Assembly mandated the High Commissioner to 
“coordinate” human rights throughout the United Nations in 1993,128 and in 2006 it mandated the 
Council to promote the “coordination and mainstreaming” of human rights throughout the United 
Nations.129 
Coordination and mainstreaming are conceptually distinct. Human rights coordination 
aims to organize the different human rights elements of a complex body, such as the UN, so they 
work together effectively.130 This has a neutral, administrative quality and is consistent with 
functional decentralization and autonomy. It means that, so far as there are existing human rights 
initiatives, they should be organised together effectively. On the other hand, human rights 
mainstreaming may be summarised as “the integration of international human rights standards 
and methodologies”.131 This is neither neutral nor purely administrative. It means that, where 
there are no human rights initiatives, they should be introduced in the relevant organizations. So 
far as this requirement originates from outside the organizations, it goes against the grain of 
functional decentralization and autonomy. 
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Effective UN human rights coordination is challenging, but at least the UN structure is 
designed for it. By contrast, the UN structure is not designed for system-wide mainstreaming 
mandated by the General Assembly and assigned to the Human Rights Council and High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. The UN structure of functional decentralization, autonomy 
and “fiefdoms” makes the introduction of any system-wide initiative, such as mainstreaming, 
very challenging. 
B. Conclusion 
While a detailed critique of functionalism is beyond the scope of this article, for present purposes 
the key point is that the UN is structured around the principles of functional decentralization and 
autonomy, and strategies to mainstream human rights have to take into account these principles 
which are woven into the fabric of the United Nations. The UN structure of functional 
decentralization, autonomy and “fiefdoms” makes the requirement of system-wide 
mainstreaming very difficult to achieve. If human rights are to become part of the culture of 
agencies, funds, programs and other UN bodies, human rights have to be ‘owned’ and 
internalized by each organization: they cannot be successfully introduced from outside. 
Agencies’ governance bodies have to either drive, or at least approve, human rights 
mainstreaming. The chief executive of one UN body (i.e. OHCHR) telling twenty-eight chief 
executives from the other UN bodies that their organizations have to mainstream human rights is 
unlikely to cut much ice.132 Consistent with the principles of functional decentralization and 
autonomy, it is the organizations’ executive boards, usually controlled by states, which have to 
be persuaded. Effective and sustained human rights engagement with, and in, agencies, funds, 
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programs and other UN bodies, will require distinctive strategies and working methods that take 
account of functional decentralization and autonomy.  
The principles of functional decentralization and autonomy are not the only obstacles 
standing in the way of human rights mainstreaming. Some states are not politically committed to 
human rights, while others have ideological objections to some categories of human rights. Some 
obstacles are based on misunderstandings, for example, some stakeholders have grasped neither 
that international economic, social and cultural rights are subject to progressive realization, nor 
that progressivity permits prioritization among these human rights, subject to various conditions. 
Some states and UN staff mistakenly think that mainstreaming will turn all UN officials into 
human rights enforcers and they are unaware of the growing evidence that integrating human 
rights into policies and programs contributes to gains for individuals and communities.133 
If there is to be effective human rights mainstreaming, these various political, ideological 
and other obstacles will have to be addressed. However, this section focuses on functional 
decentralization and autonomy so that suitable strategies and working methods can be devised to 
navigate these structural constraints to human rights mainstreaming in the United Nations.134   
 
VI. The Emerging UN Human Rights Archipelago 
Building on Section IV’s general introduction to mainstreaming, this section outlines how four 
organizations or initiatives, which may form part of the emerging UN human rights 
‘archipelago’, are mainstreaming human rights into some of their activities. 
In response to Kofi Annan’s reforms of 1997-2005, most UN agencies have taken 
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measures which they regard as human rights mainstreaming initiatives. In 1998, for example, 
UNDP published Integrating Human Rights with Sustainable Development135 which became a 
“landmark document on why and how human rights should guide the policy and practice of 
organisations other than the core UN human rights institutions.”136 Over the years, UNDP has 
confirmed and developed its approach to human rights. For example, effective from January 
2015, UNDP’s Social and Environmental Standards, which are authoritative and apply to the 
organization’s programs and projects, designate human rights as one of three overarching 
policies and principles.137 In 1998, UNICEF published A Human Rights Conceptual Framework 
for UNICEF, an influential policy paper written by Marta Santos Pais, then a member of 
UNICEF’s senior management.138 UNICEF’s mission statement confirms that the organization 
“is guided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child and strives to establish children's rights 
as enduring ethical principles and international standards of behavior towards children.”139 
Indeed, the Child Rights Convention explicitly gives UNICEF a role.140 Building on these 
foundations, UNICEF has used human rights to shape its activities, although some Executive 
Directors have been notably more enthusiastic than others. Since its early years, UNAIDS has 
deployed human rights in its work. In 1998, OHCHR and UNAIDS published the pioneering 
International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, described as “action-oriented 
measures to be employed by Governments in the area of law, administrative policy and practice 
that will protect human rights and achieve HIV-related public health goals”.141 
Other UN bodies also turned to human rights mainstreaming. In 2008, Oberleitner 
surveyed a decade of mainstreaming human rights in the UN. Mainly focussing on agencies, 
funds and programs, he placed organizations in “circles of willingness” depending on the 
seriousness with which they mainstream human rights.142 He found that ILO took mainstreaming 
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most seriously and was the sole occupant of the innermost circle. While distinguishing between 
them, Oberleitner concluded that UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIFEM (as it then was), UNHCR, 
UNESCO, FAO, WHO and HABITAT “have found different answers to the call for 
mainstreaming human rights” and he placed them in the second circle.143 According to 
Oberleitner, their “different answers” included realigning their mandates along human rights 
lines; revisiting the part of their mandate which deals with human rights in light of the demands 
of mainstreaming; rediscovering that their roots are in human rights; and putting their ‘technical’ 
expertise at the disposal of human rights bodies.144 This raises a number of important issues, not 
least how to assess the adequacy of initiatives that purport to be human rights initiatives.145 The 
World Bank and IMF were in the third circle, the World Trade Organisation was in the fourth, 
and the fifth was occupied by the International Telecommunication Union, World Intellectual 
Property Organisation and the UN Conference on Trade and Development, where the Secretary-
General’s call for mainstreaming “had not yet found resonance apart from evoking half-hearted 
rhetoric commitments (if any).”146 
Although an updated version of Oberleitner’s survey is urgently needed, it is clear from 
his work, as well as Section IV of this article, that there are numerous organizations or 
initiatives, lying beyond the UN human rights ‘mainland’, which may form part of the emerging 
human rights ‘archipelago’.147 By way of illustration, this section introduces four of them. They 
are not ‘models’ but diverse illustrations of what the ‘archipelago’ might include. Due to space 
constraints, other instructive examples have been omitted, such as the UN Development Group’s 
Human Rights Working Group.148 
The ILO is chosen because it is a major specialized agency with the longest record of 
serious human rights engagement. Human Rights up Front is included because, although it lies 
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beyond the ‘mainland’, it is not part of an agency, fund or program, but located within the Office 
of the UN Secretary-General in New York. WHO’s Gender, Equity and Rights Team is selected 
because it is a fledgling initiative of a major agency which, throughout most of its history, has 
had a fraught relationship with human rights. Lastly, a cluster of human rights initiatives within 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is included for a number of reasons, 
not least because one of the initiatives is an independent human rights complaints mechanism. 
Importantly, the assessments made here are only preliminary and provisional, they are 
neither comprehensive nor definitive. Criteria still have to be developed for an authoritative 
assessment of whether or not an organization or initiative is ‘authentic’ from the human rights 
perspective.149 Also, the illustrations do not include an evaluation of the impact of the 
organizations or initiatives.150 
A. International Labour Organization 
The ILO is the most obvious candidate to be part of the UN human rights ‘archipelago’. 
Oberleitner observes that the “the ILO, in a sense, paved the way for the creation of the UN 
human rights regime [and this] puts it in a different category from other UN institutions.”151 As 
already noted, Wilfred Jenks, Director-General of the ILO in the 1970s, saw the ILO as “the 
executing agency” of several provisions of the International Bill of Rights.152 In 1992, Virginia 
Leary wrote that the ILO “has the most highly developed intergovernmental system for the 
protection of human rights, but scholars and activists conversant with the human rights activities 
of the UN remain surprisingly ill-informed concerning its work.”153 Both aspects of this 
statement probably remain valid today. Leary argued that the ILO “has made a major 
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contribution to theory and practice by its ‘holistic’ or integrated approach to human rights.”154 In 
2013, Lee Swepston agreed with much of Leary’s assessment but took the (surprising) view that 
it was not until the 1990s that “the ILO moved firmly into the human rights arena when it 
adopted the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and Rights to Work”.155 The ILO has nearly 
200 Conventions and an equal number of Recommendations, many of them detailed and 
practical, on a wide range of labor and social issues. The Organization has designated eight of 
these Conventions as its core human rights instruments on issues such as forced labor, freedom 
of association, equal pay and child labor.156 Beyond these core human rights ILO Conventions, 
there are many others with substantive human rights content, such as ILO Convention No. 169 
on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples.157 In short, the ILO definitely contributes to 
human rights standard-setting.  
The Organization has several accountability mechanisms, such as its Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, consisting of twenty 
independent experts. Committee members routinely consider States’ reports, as well as the 
comments of national employers’ and workers’ organizations, with explicit human rights 
content.158 The ILO also has a complaints procedure for alleged violations of freedom of 
association.159 As for human rights implementation, one of the key functions of the ILO is to 
help States, by way of technical assistance (e.g. training, draft legislation and employment 
policy), to implement the Conventions and Recommendations, including those with explicit 
human rights content. 
Oberleitner concludes that, while ILO has a unique tripartite structure of governments, 
employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations which cannot easily be replicated, it 
provides “important lessons on mainstreaming human rights in international organisations:  
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detailed legal obligations together with a multi-faceted supervisory system and a targeted 
programmme of technical assistance; engagement of non-State actors; systematic, regular and 
consistent supervision of obligations; and a holistic approach which avoids a clear-cut separation 
between civil-political and socio-economic rights that are likely ingredients for success.”160 
In these circumstances, there are compelling reasons to regard the ILO as part of the UN 
human rights ‘archipelago’. 
 
B. Human Rights up Front 
The Human Rights up Front (HRuF) initiative was launched by the UN Secretary-General in 
2013.161 The catalyst for HRuF was the Petrie report commissioned by the Secretary-General 
which assessed the UN’s response to the final months of the 2009 war in Sri Lanka.162 In a 
stinging analysis, Petrie found “a continued reluctance among [UN Country Team] institutions to 
stand up for the rights of the people they were mandated to assist.”163 The report concluded that 
the UN’s “systemic failure” had seven elements, one of which was “a UN system that lacked an 
adequate and shared sense of responsibility for human rights violations”.164 Although this report 
was the trigger for HRuF, the initiative’s origins may also be traced to the UN failures in relation 
to the Rwandan genocide and Srebenica massacre. 
From the outset, HRuF “focused primarily on the UN Secretariat, Agencies, Funds and 
Programmes - and what each can do to improve the UN’s collective response to future risks of 
serious violations of human rights.”165 The Secretary-General developed a 10-page plan of action 
for the initiative which begins: 
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The Secretary-General will re-commit to the UN’s responsibilities with respect to 
preventing and responding to serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law, including the responsibilities of UN entities and staff members. 
The commitment will be grounded in international law, particularly the UN 
Charter and UN resolutions, and include a commitment to systematically gather 
information on violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and 
to present it to Member States with full impartiality.166 
 
Major themes in the action plan include UN entities’ engagement with States and other 
“influential stakeholders, including from civil society”;167 human rights capacity building;168 and 
information management systems on violations of human rights and humanitarian law.169 Senior 
management will have “leadership obligations to defend and promote human rights”170 and all 
“UN entities will use existing tools to hold accountable staff, particularly those in the most senior 
positions, for fulfilling their responsibilities with respect to serious violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law.”171 The plan anticipates a significant role for OHCHR, for 
example, the Office “will coordinate the development of a mandatory induction for UN staff at 
all levels, up to and including the Under Secretary-General level, on the UN’s human rights 
responsibilities”.172 Since the plan’s adoption, the Secretary-General has emphasised that HRuF 
“should lead to the prevention of human rights violations.”173 In 2016, when discussing with the 
General Assembly, the Deputy Secretary-General emphasised: “Prevention is the fundamental 
premise and vocation of Human Rights up Front.”174 Located in the Office of the Secretary-
General, two or three staff are responsible for driving HRuF’s plan of action. 
In her brief assessment of the plan of action, Kristen Boon highlighted some omissions, 
for example, its silence on the initiative’s relationship with the responsibility to protect. 
Nonetheless, she formed the view that the plan “represents an important step forward for human 
rights at the UN.”175 In 2014, the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect 
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concluded that HRuF is “a promising initiative” although “implementation has been chequered 
so far.”176 In a recent independent assessment, Gerrit Kurtz found the “initiative has had a 
promising start, but … must overcome agency competition, reconcile differences in institutional 
cultures and involve constructive member states more closely.”177 
In 2016, Ambassador Choi Kyong-Lim, President of the UN Human Rights Council, 
wrote it is “important, in my opinion, for the Council to lend its full support to the Secretary-
General’s ‘Human Rights up Front’ action plan”.178 
In conclusion, HRuF is designed explicitly to prevent, and respond to, serious violations 
of international human rights and humanitarian law, and to strengthen the UN’s internal 
accountability of human rights. An initiative of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and supported 
by a small secretariat situated in his Office, a key issue for the future will be the level of support 
provided by the next Secretary-General. However, for the time being there is a prima facie case 
that HRuF is part of the emerging UN human rights ‘archipelago’. 
C. WHO’s Gender, Equity and Rights Team 
Benjamin Meier and his colleagues provide important insights into human rights mainstreaming 
in WHO since 1948.179 The fortunes of human rights, which have ebbed and flowed as Director-
Generals have come and gone, will not be summarized here.180 When the author served as the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the right to health (2002-2008), he found that human rights in WHO 
remained marginal and contested, despite the remarkable efforts of a small handful of highly 
committed officials. 
The current Director-General, Margaret Chan, has made major changes to human rights 
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mainstreaming in WHO. First and foremost, she has linked human rights with equity, gender and 
social determinants and required them to be mainstreamed together across the Organization.181  
A Gender, Equity and Rights (GER) team was launched at the World Health Assembly in 2012. 
Located within the Family, Women’s and Children’s Health cluster, the GER team spearheads 
the mainstreaming of gender, equity and human rights in headquarters, six regional offices and 
country teams: this is an extremely challenging undertaking.182 The team works closely with a 
separate unit on social determinants of health. At headquarters, the team comprises a Team 
Leader and three technical officers, one for each of gender, equity and human rights. In regions 
and countries, the work is usually managed by staff on a part-time basis. The GER team fosters, 
and relies very heavily upon, collaborative departmental networks across the Organization.183 
WHO has adopted a Roadmap for action: Integrating equity, gender, human rights and 
social determinants into the work of WHO (2014-19).184 Aligned with WHO’s existing priorities, 
such as universal health coverage and non-communicable diseases, the Roadmap has three main 
pillars: institutional and programmatic mainstreaming (i.e. “the transformation of an 
organizational culture from within”),185 health inequality monitoring and data disaggregation, 
and country support for mainstreaming. In its work, the GER team explicitly draws from 
international human rights treaties and UN human rights treaty-bodies, such as CESCR’s 
General Comment 14 on the right to health.186 
The team has recently published its report on its activities during 2014-15 and recounts 
achievements in headquarters, the regions and countries.187 It is possible to neither summarize 
nor evaluate these achievements here, but they include the integration of GER perspectives in the 
WHO programme budget for 2016-2017, placing GER in mandatory induction for all new staff 
in headquarters, contributing to the delivery of a Health Equity and Human Rights course in 
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Cairo for participants from WHO’s Eastern Mediterranean Region, technical support for 
deepening human rights content in several national health polices, and publication of Anchoring 
universal health coverage in the right to health.188 As the report puts it: “Institutional 
mainstreaming mechanisms, capacity building and direct country support are the hallmarks of 
mainstreaming advances in the 2014-2015 biennium.”189 
Linking human rights, equity, social determinants and gender is controversial. Meier and 
Onzivu have reported that “the integration of human rights among normative frameworks for 
gender and equity has been viewed by critics within and outside WHO as diminishing the role of 
international human rights law as a basis for global health governance.”190 Their concern is that 
integrating a legal framework (i.e. international human rights law) with non-legal frameworks 
(i.e. gender and equity) diminishes the legal status of international human rights. On the other 
hand, equity, social determinants and gender have much greater currency, within global health, 
than human rights. Thus, linking human rights, equity, social determinants and gender can be 
seen as either a devious device to diminish binding international human rights law, or a shrewd 
strategy by which equity, social determinants and gender provide a vehicle for effective human 
rights implementation in the health sector. It is too early to assess which view is more accurate. 
More evidence is needed.  
Of course, the team’s claims about its activities in 2014-15 need careful scrutiny. 
However, the GER initiative appears to be making a contribution to human rights mainstreaming 
in WHO. It uses explicit human rights language and analysis, has staff and resources (albeit too 
few), is delivering some human rights activities, and enjoys a degree of high-level support within 
the Organisation. On the other hand, WHO does not yet have a formal human rights policy, in 
contrast to some of its regional offices, such as PAHO.191 Nonetheless, there is a prima facie 
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case that the GER initiative is part of the emerging UN human rights ‘archipelago’. 
D. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (‘Global Fund’) 
Although the Global Fund is not formally part of the UN, it is briefly included here because it is 
a partnership and financing mechanism that implements UN technical guidance on the three 
diseases, UN bodies are represented in its governance structures, it works closely with UNAIDS, 
WHO, UNDP and World Bank at the operational level, and it has recently established an 
independent human rights complaints process which explicitly includes UN human rights 
mechanisms.192 
The Global Fund was established in 2002 with the mission of directing resources to 
countries to support their response to AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. In 2013, it was the main 
multilateral funder of health programs, investing in more than 140 countries and disbursing 
between two and three billion US dollars a year.193 The Fund’s Board is composed of 
representatives from donor and implementing governments, UN bodies, civil society in both 
developed and developing countries, the private sector, private foundations, and affected 
communities. Human rights advocates and members of communities living with and affected by 
HIV and TB became alarmed that some programs supported by the Global Fund were violating 
human rights.194 The Board adopted a new strategy for 2012-2016 with five objectives, one of 
which is to protect and promote human rights through three strategic actions: to ensure that the 
Fund does not support programs that infringe human rights; to integrate human rights 
considerations, including non-discrimination, gender equality, participation, transparency and 
accountability, throughout the grant cycle; and to increase investment in programs that address 
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rights-related barriers to access, including those relating to gender inequality.195 
Steps were taken to ensure delivery of these actions, for example, human rights staff were 
appointed, an Human Rights Reference Group to provide expert guidance was established, staff 
were trained in human rights, the Board’s strategy committee approved a process to put the 
human rights strategy into practice, briefings for applicants were prepared,196 and human rights 
grants have been made.197 In November 2015, for example, the Fund made a US$10.5 million 
grant to address human rights barriers faced by vulnerable communities, and to facilitate access 
to healthcare, in ten African countries.198 
The Global Fund has a grant agreement which establishes its expectations for all the 
programs it supports. Five minimum human rights standards are now part of the grant agreement: 
non-discriminatory access to services for all, including people in detention; employ only 
scientifically sound and approved medicines or medical practices; do not employ methods that 
constitute torture or that are cruel, inhuman or degrading; respect and protect informed consent, 
confidentiality and the right to privacy concerning medical testing, treatment or health services 
rendered; and avoid medical detention and involuntary isolation, which, consistent with the 
relevant guidance published by the World Health Organization, are to be used only as a last 
resort.199 
In November 2014, as part of the roll-out of the new provisions in the grant agreement, 
the Fund decided to establish a human rights complaints procedure, building on existing 
whistleblowing procedures for fraud and corruption.200 If someone believes that they have either 
experienced or witnessed a violation of any of these five human rights standards in a Global 
Fund-financed program, he or she can file a complaint with the Fund’s Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG).201 The OIG is independent of the Fund’s secretariat and accountable to the 
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Board. An organization may file a complaint on behalf of an individual or group that is directly 
affected, provided it has a letter of authorization.202 The OIG’s investigations may include 
conducting witness interviews and collecting documentation and other evidence.203 “In 
interpreting the results of the investigation and assessing whether there has been a violation of 
the relevant human rights standard, the OIG will be guided by international human rights law.”204 
If the investigation finds a failure to comply with the minimum human rights standards this may 
lead to follow-up actions, such as discussing with senior government leaders, technical assistance 
and issuing a public statement.205 A “material breach”206 can trigger the remedies set out in the 
grant agreement, for example, as a last resort, the Fund may “decide to restrict the use of Grant 
Funds to finance non-compliant Program Activities.”207 No part of the UN human rights 
‘mainland’ has at its disposal a comparable financial sanction when a duty-bearer fails to comply 
with international human rights standards. If the OIG finds a complaint is eligible for 
investigation, but it is not feasible for the Office to take further action, for example, for security 
reasons, the Office may, with the consent of the complainant, share the information “with the 
relevant UN human rights mechanisms (such as the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Health)”.208 According to a report submitted to the Global Fund Board in November 2015, in the 
first six months of 2015, nine human rights-related complaints were raised, three of which were 
being investigated under the new human rights complaints procedure. The remaining six were 
being considered through other OIG procedures because they did not meet the complaints 
procedure's eligibility criteria.209 
In recent years the Global Fund has adopted a strategy prioritizing human rights, 
appointed a small human rights team, explicitly placed some human rights into its grant 
agreement, and established an independent human rights complaints process. There is a prima 
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facie case that the Global Fund’s cluster of human rights initiatives is de facto part of the 
emerging UN human rights ‘archipelago’. 
E. Conclusion 
None of the four organizations or initiatives considered here falls within the narrow conception 
of the UN human rights system.210 Yet they are all using explicit human rights language in 
pursuit of one or more of the objectives associated with human rights in the United Nations: 
human rights standard-setting; responding to, and preventing, human rights violations; human 
rights implementation, including mainstreaming; or accountability for human rights. Their 
human rights work appears to be neither slight nor rhetorical. They have resources, although very 
few,211 and political support. Those that are part of a larger organization are integral to it, they 
are not ‘flying below the radar’. Each is part of the UN ‘family’, with the possible exception of 
the Global Fund. If an unpaid Special Rapporteur, supported by an OHCHR member of staff, is 
part of the UN human rights system, it is unclear why the four organizations or initiatives may 
not also be part of the UN human rights system. In short, the emergence of the ‘archipelago’ 
means the narrow conception of the UN human rights system has been overtaken by practice and 
is now outdated. 
Jenks envisaged UN bodies, such as ILO, have the responsibility to translate human 
rights “from principles into practicalities”.212 This is what the four organizations or initiatives are 
endeavoring to do in their different activities and spheres of influence. They are often aiming to 
make human rights standards more operational, a process which usually requires a degree of 
specialist competence and expertise. In other words, most of their work is towards the executive 
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end of the implementation spectrum.213 
A common feature of all four illustrations is that they are helping to mainstream and 
internalize human rights standards in their organizations or sectors, such as the UN secretariat 
(via HRuF), WHO (via GER), and the Global Fund (via its cluster of human rights initiatives). 
Consistent with the principles of functional decentralization and autonomy, they are doing this 
from within their respective organizations.214 
The four organizations and initiatives give rise to serious questions. For example, is it 
realistic to expect two or three staff to drive such an important and ambitious initiative as HRuF? 
Effective mainstreaming requires a balance between bureaucratization and practical genuine 
implementation: is GER striking the right balance? The Global Fund’s human rights complaints 
procedure is grounded on five minimum human rights standards, what about the other legally 
binding international and national human rights standards? 
However, neither is the ‘mainland’ free from serious questions from the human rights 
perspective. Why did the Council do so little to deliver its core mainstreaming mandate in its 
first decade? If a treaty-body considers a country for six hours once every five years, and it has 
ten key articles to review, one of which is the right to health, and it devotes roughly equal time to 
each article, this means it has 36 minutes every five years to consider a country’s entire right to 
health record – is this credible?215 Current members of CESCR are highly eminent in their fields 
of expertise, most are exceptionally experienced lawyers and none has a qualification in health216 
- does this diminish CESCR’s authority among health professions, just as an oversight body of 
the right to a fair trial might be diminished among lawyers if the body consists of dermatologists 
and dentists?217 
In summary, this section is not arguing that the four organizations and initiatives are 
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adequate or satisfactory from the human rights perspective, it is suggesting that, on the basis of a 
preliminary and provisional assessment, they appear to have reached a minimum human rights 
threshold and may be regarded as part of the emerging UN human rights ‘archipelago’. Not all 
UN human rights initiatives merit such a cautiously positive assessment, for example, Barrett 
and Nowak have argued convincingly that “human rights have received little more than lip 
service in the UN drug control system” which includes the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
International Narcotics Control Board and UN Office on Drugs and Crime.218 
Finally, the emerging UN human rights ‘archipelago’ raises issues of quality control and 
coherence. What can be done to help agencies ensure their human rights initiatives are consistent 
with international human rights standards? Cali, McGregor and Radicic observe that “a major 
concern for international human rights law is how to master the exponential growth in 
international human rights standards and norms, jurisprudence, actors and institutions, often with 
competing or nuanced differences in their articulation and interpretation of the law.”219 They 
warn this growth “leads to internal fragmentation and the increasing emergence of sub-
communities” specialized in particular areas of international human rights law,220 and they 
conclude that “internal fragmentation raises serious questions about the coherence and unity of 
international human rights law”.221 With these important points in mind, the next section 
includes a way to promote quality control (or ‘authenticity’) and coherence in the emerging UN 
human rights ‘archipelago’. 
VII. Ways Forward 
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In the “era of implementation”, a key challenge is to accelerate the emergence of the human right 
‘archipelago’ by internalizing or indigenizing human rights within all agencies, funds, programs 
and other UN bodies, subject to suitable quality control. This requires the international human 
rights community to give much more serious and sustained attention to what lies beyond the 
‘mainland’. States supportive of mainstreaming, institutions in the ‘mainland’, civil society 
groups, experts, activists and scholars will have to give a higher priority to the executive boards 
and assemblies of agencies and similar UN bodies, while also working closely with chief 
executives and senior management. In many of these bodies, it will be difficult, and take time, to 
indigenize human rights.222 
Given functional decentralization and autonomy, inhabitants of the UN human rights 
‘mainland’ will need to be sensitive to the cultures, concepts, institutions and procedures of 
agencies and other UN bodies, and forge constructive relationships with the ‘archipelago’. They 
will have to engage in “practical ‘interoperability’” i.e. listen to, and learn from, other fields, 
without compromising international and national human rights law.223 When appropriate, the 
‘mainland’ should welcome, encourage, foster, support and scrutinize the ‘archipelago’. The 
‘mainland’ is not diminished by the ‘archipelago’, on the contrary, the ‘archipelago’ is a measure 
of the ‘mainland’s’ success. 
Human rights mainstreaming within the United Nations cannot be dissociated from 
human rights mainstreaming within governments. The governance structures of agencies, funds, 
programs and other UN bodies vary but, to one degree or another, they are controlled by states. 
There can be no meaningful mainstreaming in agencies without a greenlight from at least some 
states. State delegates sitting on agencies’ governance bodies are often from ministries in 
capitals, such as education, housing and health. These delegates may hesitate to approve 
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effective human rights mainstreaming in an agency unless there is at least some familiarity with, 
and support for, human rights within their national ministries. This has far-reaching implications. 
States will have to take steps to dismantle national silos and ensure their delegates in the 
‘mainland’, and their delegates in agencies, adopt consistent positons on human rights. Tackling 
‘disconnected’ government is difficult and has major implications for national ministries, 
national human rights institutions, and civil society in countries. 
Numerous steps are needed to advance implementation, mainstreaming and the 
development of the UN human rights ‘archipelago’. This article does not attempt to outline a 
strategy for addressing all these complex issues. Instead, it outlines three ways to advance this 
agenda, beginning with the working methods of the Human Rights Council. 
A. New Working Methods for the Council 
During the “era of declaration”, the UN human rights ‘mainland’ negotiated an extensive 
international human rights code of numerous treaties, declarations, guidelines and other 
instruments. By a remarkable feat of imagination, it also designed a number of mechanisms to 
hold states accountable for their obligations arising from the international human rights code. 
Today, in the Human Rights Council, these accountability mechanisms include the confidential 
complaints procedure, country and thematic ‘special procedures’, Universal Periodic Review and 
commissions of inquiry. Among treaty-bodies, the accountability mechanisms include periodic 
reporting, complaints procedures, inquiries and unrestricted visits to places where persons are 
deprived of their liberty. These international accountability mechanisms were established despite 
the principle of state sovereignty and article 2(7) UN Charter. Although the code is not 
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comprehensive and its accountability mechanisms are deeply flawed, they have been described 
as “monumental achievements”.224 
The working methods inherited by the Human Rights Council in 2006 were designed for 
the “era of declaration”, for example, working groups for drafting instruments and the 
confidential complaints procedure and ‘special procedures’ for holding states accountable. In 
addition, the Council was given two new accountability mechanisms, Universal Periodic Review 
and commissions of inquiry. These working methods can only partly contribute to the promotion 
of the “full implementation” and mainstreaming of human rights.225 Also, the Council’s working 
methods are more effective for the implementation and mainstreaming of civil and political 
rights than they are for ESCR.226 
The UN human rights ‘mainland’ urgently needs new and effective working methods that 
are designed for the “era of implementation”. One possibility is outlined in the next paragraphs. 
B. Inter-sessional Human Rights Council Mainstreaming Working Group 
Just as the Commission on Human Rights had to imagine and establish working methods for 
holding states accountable, today the Council has to imagine and establish effective working 
methods for its implementation and mainstreaming mandates. The challenges faced by the 
Commission in the “era of declaration”, and by the Council in the “era of implementation”, are 
of comparable importance and magnitude. 
Whatever form the new working methods might take, the Council needs to establish a 
supportive, collaborative process with five features: 
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1. Out-reach to UN agencies’ governing bodies and senior management i.e. the process 
cannot be confined to the Palais des Nations; 
2. Led by two or three Ambassadors on behalf of the Council; 
3. Include two or three senior national policy-makers, such as a minister of education, 
housing or health; 
4. Co-opt two or three independent experts; 
5. Have continuity so it can support UN bodies as they devise and rollout appropriate ways 
to implement and mainstream human rights in their organizations. 
By way of illustration, one approach might be an inter-sessional Human Rights Council 
Mainstreaming Working Group with these five features. If invited, the Working Group would 
attend a UN agency, such as one of its governing bodies, report on developments in the Council 
which relate to the agency’s work, and also learn about the agency’s implementation and 
mainstreaming achievements, challenges and next steps. In this way, the Working Group would 
discuss, and provide support to, the human rights mainstreaming units which several UN 
agencies have already established. Because agencies have universal membership, this approach 
is consistent with the Council’s principle of non-selectivity.227 
The Working Group’s composition could be adjusted depending upon the agency in 
question. For example, if invited to discuss human rights implementation and mainstreaming 
with the WHO Executive Board, or World Health Assembly, the Working Group might wish to 
include one or two ministers of health among its membership. If invited to discuss with a 
governing body of FAO, the Working Group might adjust its composition. Crucially, the 
Working Group would complement and support the technical expertise on implementation and 
mainstreaming already provided by OHCHR and the secretariat in other agencies. One of its 
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responsibilities would be to promote the coherent and consistent application of international 
human rights, as well as the formulation of ‘authentic’ human rights initiatives, across the 
‘archipelago’.228 
The Working Group is an illustrative method for the promotion of implementation and 
mainstreaming. Whether or not it is the best way forward, the Council needs some sort of 
purposive, practical, targeted and sustained process which collaboratively engages with UN 
agencies’ governing bodies and staff, with a view to the promotion of the “full implementation” 
and mainstreaming of human rights. Presently, the Council has over 40 thematic special 
procedures with the primary task of holding states accountable.229 It needs at least one effective 
method specifically designed for “full implementation” and mainstreaming in the emerging 
‘archipelago’. In this way, the Council can begin to provide the political leadership for 
implementation and mainstreaming which the General Assembly called for in 2006. 
C. Quality Control, Authenticity, and Coherence 
Just because a UN agency calls an initiative a ‘human rights’ initiative does not mean it is. 
Alston highlights this possibility when he refers to “authentically human rights-conscious” 
organizations,230 a reminder that the human rights claims of some organizations might be 
inauthentic. In a related context, Alston warns against “epistemological misappropriation” when 
“the discourse of international human rights law” is used “to describe an agenda which has a 
fundamentally different ideological underpinning.”231 In short, human rights implementation, 
mainstreaming and the ‘archipelago’ need to be subject to some form of quality control. Criteria 
are needed to decide whether or not the organization or initiative can properly be regarded as 
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‘authentic’ from the human rights perspective.  
In this context, it is necessary to distinguish two questions. One, what criteria should be 
used to assess whether or not an organisation or initiative is ‘authentic’ from the human rights 
perspective? Two, how effective is the human rights organisation or initiative i.e. what is its 
impact? Although both questions are important, this section focusses on the first. 
When assessing whether or not an initiative is ‘authentic’ from a human rights 
perspective, and thus might form part of the UN human rights ‘archipelago’, three steps are 
suggested. 
First, does the initiative contribute to human rights standard-setting; responding to, and 
preventing, human rights violations; human rights implementation, including mainstreaming; or 
accountability for human rights? These are among the key objectives of the UN human rights 
‘mainland’ and it is logical that a putative human rights initiative should contribute to at least one 
of them, subject to an important condition: the human rights element must be explicit. For 
example, an initiative that contributes to human rights implementation, but not human rights 
standard-setting, might be ‘authentic’, provided the implementation explicitly uses human rights 
language and analysis. 
The reference to “human rights standard-setting” requires clarification. It is not the 
responsibility of the ‘archipelago’ to create new human rights: this remains the responsibility of 
appropriate bodies in the ‘mainland’ in accordance with suitable processes.232 However, as 
already discussed, agencies and similar UN bodies have unmatched competence and expertise to 
translate existing human rights into practice, including by way of detailed, specific, operational 
guidelines, such as the “action-oriented” International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human 
Rights published by OHCHR and UNAIDS.233 The reference to “human rights standard-setting” 
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in the previous paragraph alludes to operational standard-setting derived from existing human 
rights norms. 
Second, is the initiative consistent with the Common Understanding of a Human Rights-
based Approach to Development Cooperation which was agreed among UN agencies in 2003?234 
Although the focus of the Understanding is development cooperation, and human rights 
mainstreaming is not confined to development,235 the principles identified in the Understanding 
have wider application. In brief, the Understanding advises that relevant programmes, policies 
and technical assistance should (a) further the realisation of international human rights, (b) guide 
all programming, and (c) contribute to the development of the capacities of duty-bearers to meet 
their obligations and/or rights-holders to claim their rights.  
Third, more specifically and practically, it is suggested that an ‘authentic’ human rights 
initiative will usually be evidenced by: 
 
• Human rights leadership from senior officers in the relevant organisation e.g. public 
statements, in support of human rights, by the chief executive. 
• A human rights policy adopted by a high-level body within the relevant organisation. 
• The integration of this high-level policy into all phases of programming. 
• Adequate resources to support the human rights initiative, including staff. 
• Constructive engagement with international and national human rights bodies, such as 
Human Rights Council, treaty-bodies, national human rights institutions and civil society 
organizations. 
• A periodic independent review of the mainstreaming initiative (e.g. by a UN Special 
Rapporteur or other suitably qualified independent person or entity), reporting to an 
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appropriate political body (e.g. executive board of the organisation responsible for the 
initiative and/or Human Rights Council); independent review is needed to help ensure the 
initiative appropriately applies human rights standards. 
• From the outset, multi-disciplinary and multi-method evaluation to capture the impact (or 
effectiveness) of the mainstreaming initiative. 
Human rights mainstreaming is usually work-in-progress. It is likely to be rolled-out 
progressively, gradually encompassing additional programs and projects. Even if mainstreaming 
is not yet agency-wide, the agency may nevertheless have some initiatives that are ‘authentic’ 
from a human rights perspective. Large organizations are rarely homogenous. WHO, for 
example, consists of its headquarters in Geneva, six largely autonomous Regional Offices, and 
more than 100 country teams. Consequently, one may decline to call WHO a human rights 
organization, but content to regard some of its initiatives as ‘authentic’ from the human rights 
perspective,236 and therefore willing to regard these initiatives, rather than WHO as a whole, part 
of the UN human rights ‘archipelago’. Exceptionally, human rights may be so comprehensively 
and effectively embedded throughout an organization that it is credible to regard it as a human 
rights organization. The ILO may be such an exception.237 
D. Research and Guidance 
There is a need for research and guidance to support human rights mainstreaming in the United 
Nations, including the following. 
One, a mapping of the United Nations system to identify existing human rights initiatives 
that may form part of the ‘archipelago’. 
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Two, in his research on the United Nations, Oberleitner found “the results of 
mainstreaming human rights are uneven, ill explored and the whole process is still little 
understood”.238 He concluded there is “a number of mutually beneficial consequences of 
mainstreaming human rights.”239 He cautioned “that this judgement rests to a large extent on the 
self-assessment of a small number of organisations rather than on a thorough external review 
based on sound empirical methodology”240 and so he emphasised that his positive assessment 
“will have to be scrutinised more scrupulously.”241 In short, studies are needed to assess the 
impact of existing UN human rights mainstreaming initiatives. 
Three, if human rights are to be mainstreamed within the United Nations, there has to be 
conceptual clarity about what human rights mainstreaming is understood to mean in this context. 
A study is needed on the main alternative definitions, the pros and cons of each, and a 
recommended conception of mainstreaming. 
Four, building on this conceptual foundation, a practical framework for human rights 
mainstreaming in the United Nations would be very useful. Agreed in 2003, the Common 
Understanding of a Human Rights-based Approach to Development Cooperation was designed 
to advance mainstreaming.242 Since the Understanding’s adoption, the UN has gained 
considerable experience in human rights mainstreaming. Also, the focus of the Understanding is 
development cooperation, and human rights mainstreaming is not confined to development.243 
For both reasons, it is timely to adopt a new Understanding which would provide agencies and 
other UN bodies with a practical framework for human rights mainstreaming in their work. 
Based on this new generic framework, individual agencies may develop, in collaboration with 
OHCHR, their own more detailed mainstreaming requirements as they integrate human rights in 
their organizations. Some agencies have already taken steps in this direction.244 
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Five, criteria are needed to assess whether or not human rights initiatives undertaken by 
agencies and other UN bodies are ‘authentic’ from the human rights perspective. This section 
outlines one approach to this issue of quality control.245 
Finally, the focus of the second recommendation is assessment of the impact of United 
Nations human rights mainstreaming initiatives. However, more generally speaking, there is an 
urgent need to deepen research on, and evaluation of, the impact of human rights-shaped 
initiatives on individuals, communities and populations. Today, there is a scarcity of such 
research and evaluation.246 In the “era of declaration”, with its focus on standard-setting and 
establishing international accountability mechanisms, gathering evidence of impact of human 
rights was not a priority. However, in the “era of implementation”, evidence of impact of human 
rights is important for at least two reasons. One, the full spectrum of human rights 
implementation depends upon engagement with a wide range of professions, some of which 
attach a lot of importance to evidence of impact of interventions. In these circumstances, it is 
helpful if there are evidential arguments supplementing (not replacing) the compelling normative 
arguments in favor of human rights. Two, there are often several different ways to implement a 
human right in which case it is helpful, but not necessarily determinative, to know which way 
has most impact. In the “era of implementation”, research on, and evaluation of, the impact of 




To recap, this article considers the UN human rights system in the “era of implementation”. The 
“full implementation” of human rights requires a wide range of laws, regulations, policies, 
judicial and quasi-judicial decisions, plans, programs, projects, practices and other interventions 
or initiatives, much of which falls beyond the institutional competence, expertise and capacity of 
the UN human rights ‘mainland’ consisting of Human Rights Council, treaty-bodies, High 
Commissioner and OHCHR. Specialized agencies, funds, programs and other UN bodies have an 
indispensable role to play if the UN system is to engage with the entire spectrum of 
implementation. The Human Rights Council and OHCHR are mandated to promote human rights 
mainstreaming which is a pre-condition for the “full implementation” of human rights. However, 
system-wide mainstreaming runs into the principles of functional decentralization and autonomy 
which are woven into the fabric of the UN. Accordingly, human rights have to be ‘owned’ and 
internalized by each agency and similar body, they cannot be successfully introduced from 
outside. There is today an emerging ‘archipelago’ of human rights initiatives, lying beyond the 
UN human rights ‘mainland’, in agencies and elsewhere. This ‘archipelago’ points the way 
forward for human rights in the “era of implementation”. The emergence of the ‘archipelago’ 
means the narrow conception of the UN human rights system has been overtaken by practice and 
is now outdated. The contemporary UN human rights system should be configured as the 
‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ and the article outlines three ways to promote its development.  
Although some parts of the ‘archipelago’ have particular competence and expertise in 
ESCR, this does not mean that the ‘mainland’ should focus on civil and political rights, and the 
‘archipelago’ should focus on ESCR. In keeping with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, both ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ have to give due attention to civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights.247 The contribution of the ‘mainland’ may be towards the legislative 
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end of the implementation spectrum and the contribution of the ‘archipelago’ may be towards the 
executive end.248 The ‘mainland’ may focus on general legal guidance, quality control and 
coherence, and the ‘archipelago’ may focus on detailed, specific, operational issues. If they do 
not already have them, both will need suitable accountability arrangements.249 The process to 
work out a mutually reinforcing relationship between ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ is vitally 
important and has already begun. In this regard, the High Commissioner and OHCHR are doing 
much more than the Council. Within the ‘mainland’, Charter-bodies and treaty-bodies endeavor 
to reinforce each other’s work, equally ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’ need to develop a strong 
symbiotic relationship. The crucial point is that the General Assembly’s call for the “full 
implementation” and mainstreaming of human rights depends upon an effective UN human 
rights system encompassing both ‘mainland’ and ‘archipelago’. 
This article emphasizes that the Human Rights Council has to imagine and establish new 
working methods commensurate with its responsibilities in the “era of implementation”.250 The 
methods of the Commission on Human Rights, forged in the “era of declaration”, are not 
adequate for the “full implementation” and effective mainstreaming of human rights. Business as 
usual will not do the job. However, the challenges presented by the “era of implementation” are 
not confined to the Council. They extend to all parts of the ‘mainland’, other UN bodies, national 
ministries and elsewhere. New strategies are called for, accompanied by a new vision of the UN 
human rights system. The successful transition from the “era of declaration” to the “era of 
implementation” requires a paradigm shift in the UN’s approach to human rights. 
In conclusion, since the 1940s, the UN has established the human rights ‘mainland’ 
which remains both the core of the UN human rights system and the primary guardian of 
international human rights. However, the ‘mainland’ does not have a monopoly on human rights 
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and the UN human rights landscape is changing. While the Council has done little to fulfil its 
core mainstreaming mandate, the High Commissioner and OHCHR, working with their partners, 
deserve credit for advancing human rights mainstreaming across the UN system, despite major 
structural and financial constraints. Nonetheless, in the “era of implementation”, the UN human 




* Paul Hunt is a Professor in Law at Essex University (UK) and Adjunct Professor at Waikato 
University (New Zealand). He served as an independent expert on the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1999-2002) and UN Special Rapporteur on the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health (2002-2008). Between 2011-2013, he advised WHO 
Assistant Director-General Dr.Flavia Bustreo on human rights. He has written extensively on 
economic, social and cultural rights, especially the right to the highest attainable standard of 
health. His recent books include: Maternal Mortality, Human Rights and Accountability 
(Routledge, co-edited) and Women’s and Children’s Health: Evidence of Impact of Human 
Rights (WHO, co-authored). He has an Honorary Doctorate from the Nordic School of Public 
Health. 
While writing this article, I benefitted from the comments and insights of many people. I am 
most grateful to all of them, especially Michael Freeman, Sabine Michalowski, Ahmed Shaheed, 
Daragh Murray, Claire Hubert, Shyama Kuruvilla, Rebekah Thomas, Rajat Khosla, Craig 
Mokhiber, Dragana Korljan, Sally-Anne Way, Marc Limon, Ralph Jurgens, Sara Davis, 
Hyeyoung Lim, Melvyn Young, Michael Keating, Ben Majekodunmi, Rick Lines and Damon 
Barrett. Throughout, Giulia Giannuzzi provided first-class research assistance for which I am 
extremely grateful. However, the views are mine and any errors are my responsibility. 
                                                 
1
 UN Secretary-General, Address to the UN Commission on Human Rights (April 7, 2005), 
http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=1388. 
2
 In this article, the ‘Council’ includes its subsidiary bodies, mechanisms and processes. 
3
 G.A. Res. 60/251, para 5(d) (March 15, 2006). 
4
 See section V. 
5
 Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 
46 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 1, 3 (1992). According to Haas: “An epistemic community is 
a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. 
6
 Lisa L. Martin, Against compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 606 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark 
A. Pollack eds., 2013). Here Martin rightly emphasizes the “risks associated with celebrating 
interdisciplinarity”. The risks associated with the “full implementation” of human rights in the 
UN system include those arising from interdisciplinarity but are more extensive because “full 
implementation” not only implicates a range of disciplines, but also different professions, interest 
groups, social groups and “epistemic communities”. 
7
 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 3, para 5(d). 
8
 Some other terms, such as ‘regimes’, ‘systems’ and ‘machinery’, require a more detailed 
discussion than was possible in this article. 
58 
                                                                                                                                                             
9
 Catherine Bevilacqua & Scott Sheeran, The UN Security Council and international human 
rights obligations: towards a theory of constraints and derogation, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Scott Sheeran & Sir Nigel Rodley eds., 2014); Daria 
Davitti & Michael O'Flaherty, International Human Rights in Field Operations: a Fast-
developing Human Rights Tool, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW (Scott Sheeran & Sir Nigel Rodley eds., 2014); BERTRAND RAMCHARAN, HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROTECTION IN THE FIELD (2006); OHCHR, ANNUAL REPORT, at 142 (2014), 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/OHCHRReport2014/WEB_version/pages/downloads.html  
10
 Sometimes the term ‘agencies’ will be shorthand for the wider group of specialized agencies, 
funds, programs and similar UN bodies. 
11
 Philip Alston, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (Philip 
Alston ed., 1992). 
12
 UN Secretary-General, Address to the UN Commission on Human Rights, supra note 1. 
13
 Kevin Boyle, The United Nations Human Rights Council: politics, power and human rights, 
60 NORTHERN IRELAND LEGAL QUARTERLY 121, 123 (2009). 
14
 OHCHR, CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE AND THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY, at 5, 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/CivilSociety/CS_space_UNHRSystem_Guide.pdf. 
15
 Petter F. Wille, The United Nations’ Human Rights Machinery: Developments and 
Challenges, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
JAKOB TH MÖLLER 9 (Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009). 
16
 OHCHR, CIVIL SOCIETY SPACE AND THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM, supra 
note 14, at 5. 
17
 Alston (1992), supra note 11, at 1. 
18
 ROSA FREEDMAN, FAILING TO PROTECT: THE UN AND THE POLITICISATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 50 
and 182 (2014). How this position fits with a 2016 article by Freedman and Mchangama is not 
clear, see Rosa Freedman & Jacob Mchangama, Expanding or Diluting Human Rights?: The 
Proliferation of United Nations Special Procedures Mandates, 38 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 
164, 192-193 (2016), briefly discussed in the conclusion to the present article. 
19
 Dinah L. Shelton, Introduction, in THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS xi (Dinah L. Shelton ed., 2014). 
20
 Or their historical equivalents e.g. not the Council but its predecessor the Commission on 
Human Rights. 
21
 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 3, para 5(d). 
59 
                                                                                                                                                             
22
 KITTY ARAMBULO, STRENGTHENING THE SUPERVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: THEORETICAL AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 5 (1999). 
23
 E.g. UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE TENTH SESSION, paras 72-242, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/705 (1954). 
24
 Philip Alston, The United Nations’ Specialized Agencies and Implementation of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 18 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW 79 (1979); Klaus Samson, Human Rights Co-ordination within the UN 
system, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 630 (Philip Alston 
ed., 1992); MATTHEW C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, 
AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 35 (1995); Bruno Simma, The 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS: NATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL, AND 
COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 81 (Franz Matscher ed., 1991). 
25
 ARAMBULO, supra note 22, at 5.  
26
 Based on Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, Reviewing two decades of IL/IR scholarship: 
what we've learned, what's next, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 639 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. 
Pollack eds., 2013). Dean Fixen and others define implementation as “a specified set of activities 
designed to put into practice an activity or program of known dimensions. According to this 
definition, implementation processes are purposeful and are described in sufficient detail such 
that independent observers can detect the presence and strength of the “specific set of activities” 
related to implementation. In addition, the activity or program being implemented is described in 
sufficient detail so that independent observers can detect its presence and strength.” DEAN L. 
FIXSEN ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH: A SYNTHESIS OF THE LITERATURE 5 (2005). 
Interesting features of this definition include the emphasis on specificity, detail and independent 
observers. 
27
 Based on Stephen Sandford, Definition of Policy, in Better livestock policies for Africa 
(1985), http://www.fao.org/wairdocs/ilri/x5499e/x5499e03.htm  
28
 Id. at para 11. The idea of a “spectrum of implementation” was inspired by the notion of a 
“spectrum of impact” in Rebekah Thomas et al., Assessing the Impact of a Human Rights-Based 
Approach across a Spectrum of Change for Women’s, Children’s, and Adolescents’ Health, 17 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 11, 11 (2015). 
29
 Paul Hunt et al., Implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 545 (Scott Sheeran & Sir Nigel Rodley 
eds., 2014). 
30
 Benjamin M. Meier& W. Onzivu, The evolution of human rights in World Health 
Organization policy and the future of human rights through global health governance, 128 
PUBLIC HEALTH 179, 179 (2014); Benjamin M. Meier & Ana S. Ayala, The Pan American 
60 
                                                                                                                                                             
Health Organization and the Mainstreaming of Human Rights in Regional Health Governance, 
42 JOURNAL OF LAW, MEDICINE AND ETHICS 356, 360 (2014). The term ‘operationalization’ has 
merit provided it is not confused with ‘operationalism’ as understood in the social sciences and 
philosophy. I am grateful to Michael Freeman for his observations on ‘operationalism’ and 
‘operationalization’. 
31
 Jana von Stein, The engines of compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 493 (Jeffrey L. 
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013). 
32
 Jurgen Neyer & Dieter Wolf, The analysis of compliance with international rules: Definitions, 
variables, and methodology, in LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN POSTNATIONAL EUROPE: COMPLIANCE 
BEYOND THE NATION-STATE 41-42 (Michael Zurn & Cjristian Joerges eds., 2005). 
33
 von Stein, supra note 31, at 478. 
34
 Lisa L. Martin, supra note 6, at 606. 
35
 Shelton, supra note 19, at xi. 
36
 PETER R. BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, THE UNITED NATIONS: REALITY AND IDEAL 33 (4th ed. 
2005). 
37
 Id. at 155. 
38
 The next section considers human rights mainstreaming in the UN. 
39
 Here the focus is on the International Bill of Rights. However, other treaties are also 
instructive in relation to specialized agencies e.g. article 45, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3, and article 38, Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, January 24, 2007, UN Doc. A/RES/61/106. 
40
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 18-19, December 16, 
1966,  993 UNTS 3. 
41
 Id. art. 22. 
42
 Eibe Riedel et al., The development of economic, social and cultural rights in international 
law, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONTEMPORARY 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES (Eibe Riedel et al. eds., 2014). 
43
 Alston (1979), supra note 24, at 82. 
44
 CLARENCE WILFRED JENKS, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LAW OF NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION IMPACT AFTER FIFTY YEARS 79 (1970). 
61 
                                                                                                                                                             
45
 Id. at 78. 
46
 Id. at 79. 
47
 Id. at 82. 
48
 Clarence Wilfred Jenks, The United Nations Covenants on Human Rights Come to Life, in 
RECUEIL D’ÉTUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL EN HOMAGE À PAUL GUGGENHEIM 812 (1968). 
49
 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Opportunities for All: Human Rights in Norway’s 




 Geir Sjøberg, Strengthening compliance, improving coherence: Norway’s White Paper on 




 Paul Hunt, Is the UN Human Rights Council delivering on its mandate to mainstream human 
rights?, Universal Rights Group (August 24, 2015), http://www.universal-rights.org/blog/un-
human-rights-council-delivering-mandate-mainstream-human-rights/   
52
 G.A. Res 70/1, Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(October 21, 2015). On 29 February, 2016, the Human Rights Council devoted a high-level panel 
to human rights mainstreaming and the Sustainable Development Goals. There were Opening 
Statements from the President of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General and High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. Panellists included the Executive Directors of UNDP and 
UNFPA. See OHCHR, Annual high-level panel discussion on human rights mainstreaming: 
“The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and human rights, with an emphasis on the 




 Mac Darrow & Louise Arbour, The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development 
Operations of the United Nations, 103 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 446, 448 
(2009). 
54
 Id. at 448. 
55
 Zdzislaw Kedzia, Mainstreaming Human Rights in the United Nations, in INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING MECHANISMS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAKOB TH MÖLLER 231 
(Gudmundur Alfredsson et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2009). 
56
 Christopher McCrudden, Mainstreaming Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 
COMMUNITY: RIGHTS AS AGENTS FOR CHANGE 9 (Colin Harvey ed., 2005). 
62 
                                                                                                                                                             
57
 Gerd Oberleitner, A Decade of Mainstreaming Human Rights in the UN: Achievements, 
Failures,Challenges, 26 NETHERLANDS QUARTERLY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 359, 386 (2008). 
58
 For the importance of definitions and greater conceptual clarity about the meaning of human 
rights mainstreaming in the United Nations system, see section 6. 
59
 G.A. Res 48/141, para 4(i) (December 20, 1993). 
60
 UN Secretary-General, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, UN Doc. 
A/51/950 (July 14, 1997); UN Secretary-General, Strengthening of the United Nations: An 
Agenda for Further Change, UN Doc. A/57/387 (September 9, 2002); UN Secretary-General, In 
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, UN Doc. A/59/205 
(March 21, 2005). 
61
 UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 60, at para 144. 
62
 G.A. Res 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, para 126 (October 24, 2005). 
63
 MARY ROBINSON, A VOICE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 299 (Kevin Boyle ed., 2006). 
64
 E.g. see ROBINSON, supra note 63, at xiii and 9; Kedzia, supra note 55, at 231; Michael 
O'Flaherty, The High Commissioner and the treaty bodies, in THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: CONSCIENCE FOR THE WORLD 105 (Felice D. Gaer & 
Christen L. Broecker eds., 2014); Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, Making the Connection: Security 
and Human Rights, in NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS MACHINERY: WHAT FUTURE 
FOR THE UN TREATY BODY SYSTEM AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL PROCEDURES 276 (M. 
Cherif Bassiouni & William A. Schabas eds., 2011). 
65
 See Global Migration Group at http://www.globalmigrationgroup.org/ 
66
 See UN Development Group, Human Rights Working Group, https://undg.org/home/undg-
mechanisms/undg-hrm/ 
67
 This paragraph draws from Hunt (2015), supra note 51. 
68
 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 3, para 3. 
69
 Human Rights Council Res. 5/1, UN Doc. A/62/53 (June 18, 2007). 
70
 G.A. Res 65/281, paras 42-44 (July 20, 2011). 
71
 Hunt (2015), supra note 51; Giulia Giannuzzi, Mainstreaming Human Rights in the United 
Nations System: A Critical Analysis (October, 2015) (unpublished LL.M Dissertation, 
University of Essex) (October, 2015) (Copy with author); OHCHR, Annual high-level panel 
discussion on human rights mainstreaming, supra note 52. 
63 
                                                                                                                                                             
72
 Giannuzzi, supra note 71, at 34. 
73
 Human Rights Council, Res 21/22, UN Doc. A/HRC/21/22 (July 2, 2012); Human Rights 
Council, Res 27/31, UN Doc. A/HRC/27/31 (June 30, 2014). 
74
 Informal report, Policy dialogue on April 24, 2015, Universal Rights Group, unnumbered 
penultimate page (Copy with author). 
75
 Of course, the two categories of human rights, on the one hand, civil and political rights, and 
on the other hand, economic, social and cultural rights, are not distinct but “interdependent and 
interrelated” – World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action, para 5, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (June 25, 1993). Nonetheless, they are enshrined in 
different Covenants within the International Bill of Rights. In this passage, references to civil and 
political rights are to those in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
December 16, 1966, 999 UNTS 171, and references to economic, social and cultural rights are to 
those in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
December 16, 1966, 993 UNTS 3. 
76
 University of Essex seminar ‘Making human rights happen’ (Geneva, March 11, 
2015), https://soundcloud.com/uniofessex/making-human-rights-happen. 
77
 Kate Gilmore et al., The Universal Periodic Review: A Platform for Dialogue, Accountability, 
and Change on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, 17 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
167, 170 (2015). 
78
 Id. at 170. 
79
 This paragraph draws from Hunt (2015), supra note 51. 
80
 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 3, para 3. 
81
 This tendency may be reinforced by Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, G.A. Res. 70/1, supra note 52. 
82
 The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common 
Understanding Among UN Agencies, https://undg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/6959-
The_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Development_Cooperation_Towards_a_Common_Un
derstanding_among_UN1.pdf   
83
 Transforming our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development gives rise to 
important responsibilities for high-income countries. However, given its focus on development, 
Transforming our World is weighted towards low-income and middle-income countries. Thus, 
human rights mainstreaming in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals is also weighted 
towards low-income and middle-income countries. In short, the challenge of human rights 
mainstreaming in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals does not fall equally on low-, 
middle- and high-income countries. 
64 
                                                                                                                                                             
84
 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 3, para 4. 
85
 Hilary Charlesworth, Not Waving but Drowning: Gender Mainstreaming and Human Rights in 
the United Nations, 18 HARVARD HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 1, 16 (2005). 
86
 MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, HUMAN RIGHTS MAINSTREAMING AS A PROJECT OF POWER (2006), 
http://iilj.org/courses/documents/Koskenniemi.pdf 
87
 Id. at 10.  
88
 Id. at 10. 
89
 Id. at 10-11. 
90
 McCrudden, supra note 56, at 16. 
91
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 389. 
92
 Id. at 390.  
93
 Id. at 364.  
94
 Hilary Charlesworth has other concerns about the ‘mainstreaming’ image, see Charlesworth, 
supra note 85, at 18. 
95
 Sarah McCosker, The ‘interoperability’ of international humanitarian law and human rights 
law: evaluating the legal tools available to negotiate their relationship, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IN THE NEW AGE OF GLOBALIZATION, 146 (Andrew Byrnes et al. eds., 2013). 
96
 See section VII, ‘Research and guidance’. 
97
 Section VII recommends both a survey and an assessment, see section VII, ‘Research and 
guidance’. 
98
 For the structural constraints, see section V. 
99
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 387. 
100
 Id. at 364. 
101
 For an overview, see Paul Taylor, Introduction, in THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS 
(David Mitrany ed., 1975) and Mark F. Imber, Functionalism: International organisations, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.com/topic/functionalism-international-
organizations. This section draws from both. 
102
 LEONARD WOOLF, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT (2nd ed, 1916). 
65 
                                                                                                                                                             
103
 Reprinted in David Mitrany, The New Deal, in THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS 160-
163 (David Mitrany ed., 1975). 
104
 Viljam Engstrom, Powers of organizations and the many faces of autonomy, in 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE IDEA OF AUTONOMY: INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 224 (Richard Collins & Nigel White eds., 2011). 
105
 Reprinted in David Mitrany, A working peace system (1966). 
106




 Clarence Wilfred Jenks, Co-ordination: a new problem of international organization, 77 
Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (1950) at para 6. 
109
 Id. at para 20. 
110
 Id. at para 11. 
111
 Id. at para 62. 
112
 See chapter 16, EVAN LUARD, THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES: THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK 
OF INTERDEPENDENCE (1977). 
113
 Samson, supra note 24, at 620. 
114
 The General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council 
(now suspended), International Court of Justice and Secretariat. 
115
 UN Charter art 57. 
116
 Emphasis added. 
117
 Jenks (1950), supra note 108, at para 41. 
118
 Id. at para 41; UN Charter art. 58. 
119
 Samson, supra note 24, at 623.  
120
 BAEHR & GORDENKER, supra note 36, at 157. 
121
 The main focus of the present discussion is the responsibility to implement and mainstream 
arising from the General Assembly resolutions establishing OHCHR and the Human Rights 
Council, as well as the Secretary-General’s reform reports published between 1997-2005. This 
article does not address the important issue of the extra-territorial human rights obligations of 
states for which see UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS, GENERAL 
66 
                                                                                                                                                             
COMMENT NO. 14: THE RIGHT TO THE HIGHEST ATTAINABLE STANDARD OF HEALTH (ART. 12 OF 
THE COVENANT), para 39, UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (August 11, 2000); Jennifer Tooze, Aligning 
States' Economic Policies With Human Rights Obligations: The CESCR's Quest For 
Consistency, 2 HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW 229 (2002); MARK GIBNEY, INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: RETURNING TO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES (2nd ed. 2016); SANAE FUJITA, THE 
WORLD BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DEVELOPING STANDARDS OF 
TRANSPARENCY, PARTICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2013); MAC DARROW, BETWEEN LIGHT 
AND SHADOW: THE WORLD BANK, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2003); SIGRUN SKOGLY, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF THE WORLD 
BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 107 and 109 (2001); SIGRUN SKOGLY, 
BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS: STATES' HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION 196 (2006); ETO Consortium, Maastricht Principles On Extraterritorial 
Obligations Of States In The Area Of Economic, Social And Cultural Rights (2013), 
http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/library/maastricht-
principles/?tx_drblob_pi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23; Olivier de Schutter et al., Commentary to 
the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations on States in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 1084 (2012); Paul Hunt, Judith 
Bueno de Mesquita & Rajat Khosla, The human rights responsibility of international assistance 
and cooperation in health, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 
104-129 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly eds., 2010). 
122
 LUARD, supra note 112, at 324; CLIVE ARCHER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 138 (3rd ed. 
2001). 
123
 Imber, supra note 101. 
124
 Id.  
125
 See Jenks (1950), supra note 108, at 151-303; Samson, supra note 24, at 620-675. 
126
 See United Nations System, Chief Executives Board for Coordination, 
http://www.unsceb.org/ 
127
 BAEHR & LEON GORDENKER, supra note 36, at 34. 
128
 G.A. Res 48/141, supra note 59, para 4(i). 
129
 G.A. Res. 60/251, supra note 3, para 3. 
130
 Based on Oxford Dictionaries, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/coordination 
131
 Kedzia, supra note 55, at 231. 
132
 For example, see Navi Pillay, Address by the High-Commissioner at the Jacob Blaustein 
Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER 
67 
                                                                                                                                                             
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: CONSCIENCE FOR THE WORLD 70 (Felice D. Gaer & Christen L. Broecker 
eds., 2014). Nonetheless, such speeches are needed. 
133
 On evidence of impact of human rights, see section VII, ‘Research and guidance’. 
134
 See section VII. 
135
 UNDP, INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS WITH SUSTAINABLE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (1998). 
136
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 368. 
137




 SANTOS PAIS MARTA, A HUMAN RIGHTS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNICEF (1999), 
http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/essay9.pdf   
139
 UNICEF, Mission Statement, http://www.unicef.org/about/who/index_mission.html  
140
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Part II, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3. 
141
 OHCHR & UNAIDS, INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2006 
CONSOLIDATED VERSION, at 14, UN Sales No. E.06.XIV.4 (2006). 
142
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 365. 
143
 Id. at 365. 
144
 Id. at 365. 
145
 See section VII, ‘Quality control, ‘authenticity and coherence’. 
146
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 365. 
147
 See section VII, ‘Research and guidance’, which recommends a new survey is conducted. 
148
 See section IV, ‘OHCHR’. 
149
 See section VII, ‘Quality control, ‘authenticity and coherence’. 
150
 See section VII, ‘Research and guidance’. 
151
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 365. 
152
 JENKS (1970), supra note 44, at 79. 
68 
                                                                                                                                                             
153
 Virginia Leary, Lessons from the Experience of the International Labour Organization, in 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 580 (Philip Alston ed., 1992).  
154
 Id. at 590. 
155
 Lee Swepston, The International Labour Organization and international human rights system, 
in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 347 (Scott Sheeran & Sir 
Nigel Rodley eds., 2014). 
156
 Id. at 347. 
157
 ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries, 27 June 1989, 1650 UNTS 383. 
158
 Swepston, supra note 155, at 346. 
159
 Swepston, supra note 155, at 346. 
160
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 367. 
161
 United Nations, ‘Human Rights Up Front’ Initiative, 
http://www.un.org/sg/humanrightsupfront/  
162
 Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on United Nations Action in Sri 




 Id. at para 76. 
164
 Id. at para 80. 
165
 United Nations, Human Rights Up Front, 
http://www.un.org/sg/humanrightsupfront/doc/RuFAP-summary-General-Assembly.shtml  
166
  ‘Rights Up Front’ Detailed Action Plan, updated January 2014, para 1.1, https://undg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Detailed-Plan-of-Action-Rights-up-Front.doc  
167
 Id. at para 4 and 5. 
168
 Id. at para 15. 
169
 Id. at para 16. 
170
 Id. at para 3.2. 
171
 Id. at para 3.1. 
69 
                                                                                                                                                             
172
 Id. at para 2.2. 
173
 Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly, UN Doc 
A/70/656 (6 January 2016). 
174
 Presentation to General Assembly, 27 January 2016 (Copy with author). 
175
 Kristen Boon, Assessing the UN’s new ‘Rights Up Front’ Action Plan, Opinio Juris (February 
27, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/02/27/assessing-uns-new-rights-front-action-plan/  
176
 International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, Rights Up Front and Civilian 
Protection: An Uneven First Year (November 25, 2014), http://icrtopblog.org/2014/11/25/rights-
up-front-and-civilian-protection-an-uneven-first-year/ 
177
 Gerrit Kurtz, With Courage and Coherence: The Human Rights up Front Initiative of the 
United Nations, Global Public Policy Initiative, at 4 (2015). 
178
 H.E. Ambassador Choi Kyong-Lim (10th President of the Human Rights Council), 2016: a 





 Generally, see Benjamin M. Meier, Global Health Governance and the Contentious Politics 
of Human Rights: Mainstreaming the Right to Health for Public Health Advancement, 46 
STANFORD JOURNAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2010); Meier & Ayala, supra note 30; 
Meier& Onzivu, supra note 30. 
180
 For example, Meier’s research shows that WHO’s first Director-General, Brock Chisholm, 
energetically advanced “a human rights basis for [WHO’s] work” but when his successor, 
Marcolino Gomes Candau, took office in 1953 “WHO intentionally neglected human rights 
discourse”, see Meier (2010), supra note 179, at 2. In 1993, Alston remarked that for “many 
years, the World Health Organization suppressed international discussion of the [right to health]: 
mention the universal right to health and they’d throw you out of the building.” HUMAN RIGHTS 
PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: 
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY DISCUSSION HELD AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL IN SEPTEMBER, 1993 at 34 
(1995). 
181
 WHO, ROADMAP FOR ACTION (2014-2019): INTEGRATING EQUITY, GENDER, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS INTO THE WORK OF WHO, at 1, WHO/FWC/GER/15.2 (2015). 
182
 Where the regional GER focal points are located within regional offices varies from one 
region to another, see figure 1 of Gender, Equity and Rights Team, draft Progress Report 2014-
2015 (Copy with author). 
183
 Gender, Equity and Rights Team, draft Progress Report 2014-2015, at 10 (Copy with author). 
70 
                                                                                                                                                             
184
 WHO, ROADMAP FOR ACTION (2014-2019): INTEGRATING EQUITY, GENDER, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND SOCIAL DETERMINANTS INTO THE WORK OF WHO, WHO/FWC/GER/15.2 (2015). 
185
 Gender, Equity and Rights Team, supra note 183, at 11.  
186
 Consider WHO, ANCHORING UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE IN THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: WHAT 
DIFFERENCE WOULD IT MAKE? POLICY BRIEF (2015). 
187
 Gender, Equity and Rights Team, supra note 183. 
188
 WHO, ANCHORING UNIVERSAL HEALTH COVERAGE IN THE RIGHT TO HEALTH: WHAT 
DIFFERENCE WOULD IT MAKE? POLICY BRIEF (2015). 
189
 Gender, Equity and Rights Team, supra note 183, at 8. 
190
 Meier & Onzivu, supra note 30, at 183. 
191
 Meier & Ayala, supra note 30. 
192
 This section draws from Sara L. M. Davis, Human rights and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria, 16 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 134 (2014). 
Also see Sara L. M. Davis, Measuring the Impact of Human Rights on Health in Global Health 
Financing, 17 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL 97 (2015). 
193
 Davis (2014), supra note 192, at 135.  
194
 For example, see OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS/CANADIAN HIV/AIDS LEGAL NETWORK, 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, Part VI 
(2011). 
195
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, The Global Fund Strategy 2012-
2016: Investing for Impact, at para 70-75, 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/strategies/Core_GlobalFund_Strategy_en/ 
196
 E.g. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Human Rights for HIV, TB, 
Malaria and HSS Grants: Information Note (February 2014), 
 http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/infonotes/Core_HumanRights_InfoNote_en/ 
197
 Davis (2014), supra note 192, at 139. 
198
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, New Grant to Support Human 
Rights in 10 African Countries (November 19, 2015), 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2015-11-
19_New_Grant_to_Support_Human_Rights_in_10_African_Countries/   
199
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Grant Regulations (2014), article 
71 
                                                                                                                                                             
6.1(2),  http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/grants/Core_Grant_Regulations_en/ 
200
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Human Rights Complaints, 
approved by Management Executive Committee, November 6, 2014 (Copy with author). Also 
see The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, The Global Fund Human Rights 




 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Human Rights Complaints, supra 
note 200, paras 1-3.  
202
 Id. at para 3(b). 
203
 Id. at para 7. 
204
 Id. at para 8. 
205
 Id. at paras 9 and 12. 
206
 Id. at para 9. 
207
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Grant Regulations (2014), supra 
note 199, at article 6.1(2)(c). 
208
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Human Rights Complaints, supra 
note 200, para 5. 
209
 The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, Mid-year 2015 Corporate KPI 




 See section II. 
211
 The ILO is an exception. No doubt it needs more resources, but its resources are not “very 
few”. 
212
 See section III, including the discussion of article 23, ICESCR. 
213
 See section III. 
214
 See section V. 
215
 Although this is based on the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
the point being made (i.e. the inadequacy of treaty-body review of countries) has wide 
application. 
72 
                                                                                                                                                             
216
 According to an examination of members’ biographies at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CESCR/Pages/Membership.aspx accessed on 11 January 
2016. 
217
 This criticism is not confined to CESCR. Importantly, since 1990, CESCR has made, and 
continues to make, an enormous contribution to the jurisprudence of international economic, 
social and cultural rights. The Committee has cemented the place of economic, social and 
cultural rights in international human rights. However, CESCR is subject to constraints, such as 
insufficient time to do its job and a membership which is not professionally diverse. Notably, 
these constraints are not the fault of CESCR. States determine the number and length of CESCR 
sessions and they elect CESCR members. 
218
 Damon Barrett & Manfred Nowak, The United Nations and Drug Policy: Towards a Human 
Rights-Based Approach, in THE DIVERSITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
PROFESSOR KALLIOPI K. KOUFA 449 (Aristotle Constantinides & Nikos Zaikos eds., 2009). Also 
see RICHARD LINES, DRUG CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 
2016); Joanne Csete, Overhauling oversight: human rights at the INCB, in Governing the Global 
Drug Wars, LSE Ideas, Special Report 63-68 (2012); Damon Barrett, Reflections on Human 
Rights and Drug Control, in Governing the Global Drug Wars, LSE Ideas, Special Report 56-62 




 Başak Çalı, Lorna McGregor & Ivana Radačić, ESIL Interest Group on Human Rights 








 For a recent summary of the human rights challenges in the World Bank, see Philip Alston 
(Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights, UN Doc. A/70/274 (August 4, 2015). 
223
 See section IV and interoperability. 
224
 Wille, supra note 15, at 12. 
225
 See section III. 
226
 See section IV. 
227
 However, even though an agency has universal membership, its human rights initiatives could 
be skewed towards low- or middle-income countries. No doubt the Working Group would wish 
73 
                                                                                                                                                             
to know whether or not an agency’s human rights initiatives, when looked at overall, address 
low-, middle- and high-income countries on a reasonable and equitable basis. 
228
 See ‘Quality control, ‘authenticity’ and coherence’ below. 
229
 There are 41 thematic mandates as of 27 March 2015, see OHCHR, 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx  
230
 Alston (1992), supra note 11, at 1. 
231
 Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply 
to Petersmann, 13 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 815, 842 (2002). 
232
 Philip Alston, Conjuring up new human rights: a proposal for quality control, 78 AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 606 (1984). 
233
 OHCHR & UNAIDS, INTERNATIONAL GUIDELINES ON HIV/AIDS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2006 
CONSOLIDATED VERSION, UN Sales No. E.06.XIV.4 (2006). 
234
 The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common 
Understanding Among UN Agencies, supra note 82. 
235
 Section IV. 
236
 Such as GER, see section VI. 
237
 See section VI. 
238
 Oberleitner, supra note 57, at 359. 
239
 Id. at 387. 
240
 Id. at 387. 
241
 Id. at 387. 
242
 The Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation Towards a Common 
Understanding Among UN Agencies, supra note 82. 
243
 See section IV. 
244
 For example, FAO, VOLUNTARY GUIDELINES TO SUPPORT THE PROGRESSIVE REALIZATION OF 
THE RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOODIN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL FOOD SECURITY (2005); see also 
OHCHR & WHO, A Human Rights-Based Approach to Health, in FLAVIA BUSTREO, PAUL HUNT 
ET AL., WOMEN’S AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH: EVIDENCE OF IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 112-115 
(2013). 
74 
                                                                                                                                                             
245
 See ‘Quality control, ‘authenticity’ and coherence’. 
246
 Scarce, but growing, in relation to health and human rights see, for example, FLAVIA 
BUSTREO, PAUL HUNT ET AL., WOMEN’S AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH: EVIDENCE OF IMPACT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS (2013) and Special Issue: Evidence of the Impact of Human Rights-Based 
Approaches to Health, 17 HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS JOURNAL (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2015). 
247
 For example, para 5. In a recent publication, Freedman and Mchangama appear to take a 
different view: “it is clearly unrealistic and unfeasible to expect Special Procedures mandate 
holders to make any significant contribution to topics such as global poverty … that are already 
addressed by specific international institutions with much more directly relevant expertise and 
solid funding.” Freedman & Mchangama, supra note 18, at 192. This position runs counter to the 
mainstreaming mandates of the Human Rights Council and High Commissioner for Human 
Rights.  
248
 See section III. 
249
 Of course, the ‘mainland’ already has a number of accountability processes, such as UPR and 
periodic reporting to treaty-bodies, and the ‘archipelago’ already has some, such as the ILO 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, see section VI. 
250
 See especially section VII. 
